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Abstract 
This thesis examines decolonization from the theoretical perspective put forth by Walter 
Mignolo and others as modernity/coloniality/decoloniality. It understands decoloniality to be 
a political-epistemic project grounded in the critique of colonial structures of violent 
domination as well as the autopoietic self-organization of autonomous communities. It argues 
that poetics as a creative relation of language to the social body is necessary in order to 
produce knowledge by thinking from and with these autonomous communities. Basing its 
examination of decolonization on the work of poets Aimé Césaire, Cecilia Vicuña and Beth 
Brant, this thesis shows how poetics forms a horizon in which the philosophical anthropology 
of the decolonial subject, the metacritique of reason in the space of the border, and an ethics 
of political liberation can ground new ways of instituting global concrete humanity. 
Keywords 
Walter Mignolo, Sylvia Wynter, coloniality, decoloniality, poetics, autopoiesis, Indigenous 
thought, Black thought, Caribbean, settler colonialism 
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Preface  
 My thesis will examine the significance of poetics for political-epistemic projects of 
decolonization, as theorized through the formal schema of modernity/coloniality/-
decoloniality. Arising in relation to the work of Black and Indigenous thinkers and social 
movements throughout the Americas, modernity/coloniality/decoloniality refers to the 
entangled, co-constitutive nature of the relationship between colonial structures of power and 
modernity, as well as the creative refusal of this relationship by colonized subjects in order to 
create alternative forms of knowing, doing, and living. In this context, poetry engages in 
decolonial projects through an embodied relationship of both production, from the 
perspective of the poet, and consumption, from the perspective of the reader, with 
interrelated epistemic, political, and ethical stakes involved as meaning is shared across this 
space. In this productive-consumptive relation, the poem creates a relation of decolonial 
mediation that not only formalizes the embodied experiences of the poet as a historically and 
socially produced subject, but furthermore challenges the reader to engage this space in a 
way that resists passive consumption. This dynamic of resistance and creation via cross-
cultural engagement is thus capable of opening pathways to an embodied decolonial 
subjectivity, conceptualized by Walter Mignolo and others as ‘thinking from/with’ those in 
radical exteriority. This entails a double focus throughout the thesis, pursued through a single 
line of analysis. On the one hand, I will be concerned with the way in which poetry is capable 
of facilitating an engagement with the production of meaning that can further decolonial 
projects through insurgent interruptions of dominant narratives. On the other, I will use this 
engagement with poetics to think through the fundamental features of decolonial thought as 
an autopoietic practice organizing the material-symbolic structure of the world. I will do so 
by reading the work of several poets of the Americas, linking their concrete local experiences 
and concerns to global processes and structures so as to reveal the potentiality of shared 
epistemic, political, and ethical strategies of resistance capable of forming solidarities across 
distinct experiences within the horizon of decoloniality.  
 After the introduction in which I will examine modernity/coloniality/decoloniality in 
more depth, as well as its relation to poetry as a medium for cross-cultural engagement, my 
thesis will consider the following: first, the poetry of Aimé Césaire through the lens of Black 
and Caribbean thought examining the role of body- and geo-politics in conceptualizing the 
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philosophical anthropology of the decolonial subject; second, the border-crossing 
performance poetics of Cecilia Vicuña, examining the immanent temporality of border 
encounters as a space to articulate new epistemologies and forms of agency in a global frame 
through translation; third, the poetry of Mohawk poet Beth Brant through the lens of 
Indigenous feminist critiques examining the politics of relationality through which ethical 
communities and solidarities can engage shared burdens of history. Finally, I will wrap up 
with a conclusion on the ways in which coloniality can not only highlight the shared bases 
and concerns of these various modes of resistance, but further, how it can facilitate dialogue 
within and across diverse subalternized locations beyond of the structuring coherence of 
coloniality and the global North.  
 I have limited the scope of my thesis to the Americas, despite the global reach of 
coloniality at large, for several reasons. First, the theory of modernity/coloniality, building 
off of world-systems theory, Caribbean thought, Third World socialisms/feminisms, and 
Latin American Philosophy, first emerges in the work of Latin American and Caribbean 
thinkers. Thus, while capable of expanding beyond these borders, necessitating it even, 
coloniality, and much of the work that has gone into it to date, is uniquely suited to the 
geopolitical and cultural space of the Americas. However, this does not mean that I am 
simply and schematically applying coloniality as a framework, as I will be extending its 
reach to a North American settler-colonial context which, in theories of 
modernity/coloniality, is all too often elided in favour of an undifferentiated view of it as the 
global North. Second, the Americas provides a unique and fecund space for examining 
modernity/coloniality as it is the arrival of Europeans in the so called New World, their 
encounter with the Indigenous nations and their forced relocation of enslaved Africans, that 
is the initializing moment in which the system of power and knowledge that became the 
modern/colonial world system begins to emerge. Furthermore, as the world-system continues 
to develop in complexity, the Americas continue to be a fecund site for examining the 
transformations of coloniality in the present day. 
 I have chosen poetry as the site to examine the potential for decolonizing resistances 
and relationships for reasons that will be explored in greater depth in the introduction, but a 
short word on it here will help to situate my thesis. First, in the coloniality of power and 
knowledge, literature has been a key site for forms of cultural governance. From its earliest 
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importation into the Americas it has functioned as a means of establishing national identities 
as well as a means of critiquing those identities in order to expand or complicate them over 
time. Thus, poetry as literature proves to be a key site mediating the entrance of bodies and 
knowledges into the global order. Second, and most importantly, is the key role that poetics 
itself plays in decolonization. As will be shown later, decolonization is a political and 
epistemological practice that creates alternative ways of being and knowing to those 
authorized by hegemonic Western rationalities and their hierarchies of race, class, gender, 
and sexuality manifested in particular bodies and communities. It is both a critique of these 
discourses, as well as an opening up of alternative horizons from subalternized bodies and 
traditions. A key to this process then is finding, and thinking/doing from, alternative 
situations, understood as distinct, embodied ways of being in the world, of the experience of 
time and space, and relating to others in shared proximity prior to the building of discourses 
from these experiences. Poetics, as a creative use of language, is thus a site at which these 
pre-discursive concrete forms of life can be articulated with larger discourses, in various 
relations of affirmation and resistance. Poetry, or rather each poem or body of work, is thus 
an articulation of distinct ways of being and knowing that the poetics can allow us to 
articulate and make meaningful as a means of examining how these forms variously engage 
with, collude and/or resist modernity/coloniality.  
 Ultimately, what decolonial theory reveals to us is that knowledge production rests on 
relations to the world that delineate who has the authority and legitimacy to make their points 
of view or experiences significant in the articulation of social meaning. Before responding to 
the work of Black or Indigenous poets in a decolonial way that will destabilize preconceived 
relations and lead to a decolonial subjectivity and solidarity, one must be willing to 
acknowledge Black and Indigenous experience as a legitimate point of knowledge production 
to be engaged with in ethical and political ways. A decolonial poetics confronts this 
constitutive choice by: 1) constructing its poetics from the productivity of the writer in a way 
that seeks to formalize language from their embodied experiences; 2) by making use of the 
immanence of art in order to disrupt its smooth consumption by the audience so as to 
confront them, make them see the gap between them and the writer that is cultural difference 
and socio-political positionality; and 3) to encourage the reader to negotiate this space 
through the poem in a manner that necessitates a certain ability on their part to give up 
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authority to the experience of the poet. Poetics, then, is necessary to the practice of 
conceptualizing Mignolo’s idea of ‘thinking from/with’ those in radical exteriority, by 
connecting diverse peoples, places and histories; and energizing them in order to produce 
these connections in specifically decolonial ways. This is the role that poetics plays in 
decolonial thought, connecting aesthetics to the discourses of theory, the body to knowledge, 
critique to the creation of alternative horizons of thinking and doing.  
   
 
 
  
1 
Introduction: Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality and Poetics 
as Autopoiesis 
 In this introduction I will lay out a framework for understanding decolonial 
thought, contextualizing it in relation to the equation modernity/coloniality/decoloniality. 
I will argue that decoloniality is a political-epistemic project grounded in the cosmologies 
and memories of colonized and racialized communities who have been incorporated into 
the modern capitalist world system via various organizations of colonial power. While 
these communities find themselves dominated and exploited within this modern/colonial 
world system, decoloniality nonetheless provides new horizons of meaning in the 
production of knowledge. Thus, decoloniality requires a necessary articulation of 
knowing and doing, of thinking from/with the bodies, communities, memories, and 
desires of diverse subjects who participate in the building of new worlds beyond the 
hierarchical structures of domination, vulnerability, and violence that subtend the global 
political-epistemic order. Further, I will argue that an understanding of poetics in relation 
to autopoiesis is necessary for this project. The articulation of poetics and linguistic 
practice and autopoiesis as creative self-production conjoin the practices of self-making 
present in Sylvia Wynter’s call for sociopoetics as “an alternative process of making 
ourselves human” (Wynter 89) with Humberto Maturana and Franciso Varela’s work on 
the biological, social and linguistic forms of structural coupling which define humanity 
biologically and socially as a “continually self-producing… autopoietic organization” 
(Maturana and Varela 43). From this articulation of poetics as the autopoietic force, 
expressed in language, of autonomous communities seeking political liberation according 
to their own cultural-epistemic traditions and social formations, I will argue for a series 
of principles of decolonial poiesis that are necessary for the articulation of complex 
solidarities between distinct ways of knowing and doing within the overall horizon of 
decoloniality. Together, these principles will seek to answer what philosopher Lewis 
Gordon argues are the three core concerns of decoloniality: philosophical anthropology; 
the metacritique of reason; and political liberation (Decolonization 87-8). Ultimately, I 
will seek to show the crucial role that poetics plays in thinking and writing as embodied, 
relational practices within concrete systems of domination, vulnerability, and violence 
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that can nonetheless sustain and articulate the inexhaustible desires, imaginings, and 
practices by which communities seek new ways of living in the world. I will chart the 
precarious, entangled relationship between culture and politics, the body and knowledge, 
arguing that decoloniality seeks to undo any binary opposition of these terms from the 
always-embodied perspective of the colonial difference, not so as to reify the poet or 
theorist as a saviour, but to place their practice in a critical relation to the various 
communities they are entangled with as part of a shared practice of what Walter Mignolo 
calls thinking from/with rather than for/about. 
 Thus, I will begin this introductory chapter by examining the history and 
conceptualization of modernity/coloniality/decoloniality as it has been theorized by some 
of its leading thinkers, focusing on the work of Walter Mignolo, Nelson Maldonado-
Torres, Lewis R. Gordon, and Sylvia Wynter in particular. This will involve an 
explication of each of these terms as well as their interrelatedness as a universe of 
meaning meant to link certain embodied struggles to the horizon of an alternative 
ordering of the world beyond current hierarchies of domination and their supporting 
political-epistemic model of humanity as Imperial Man. I will then move on to a brief 
discussion of the relationship between the body, violence, and knowledge in the 
construction of these hierarchies as political-epistemic structures. From this, I will show 
how understanding knowledge production as a contingent practice of autopoiesis allows 
for a re-situating of the body in relation to community so as to account for and resist the 
forms of violence that structure the distribution of agency and vulnerability instituted by 
modernity/coloniality. Finally, in considering how decoloniality as a horizon of meaning 
constructs knowledge(s) as an embodied practice from which to think from the 
community towards the transformation of the world, I will argue that a sociopoetics of 
insurgency is vital for articulating the complex solidarity of decolonial desires with the 
production of critical thought.  
 Modernity/coloniality as a concept emerges from a double genealogy. On the one 
hand, as Alejandro Vallega argues in his work Latin American Philosophy from Identity 
to Radical Exteriority (2014), the concept of coloniality, emerges from the history of 
Latin American philosophy and its attempts to think the uniqueness of Latin America in 
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relation to hegemonic forms of Eurocentric philosophy. Key to this have been the insights 
of Enrique Dussel and Anibal Quijano, who linked the process of knowledge production 
to the geopolitical and historical relations of domination that structure Latin American 
experience. Building on the world systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein and its model 
of center-periphery capitalist structural organization, Dussel recognized that “the 
exteriority of the centre is not other than the difference intrinsic to modernity, an 
exteriority created by the colonialist system that accompanies and is inseparable from 
Western modernity” (Vallega 64). Thus, modernity/coloniality springs from the critique 
of Western instrumental reason and capitalist exploitation through an attentive 
engagement with the colonial processes that produce its normative coherence and sustain 
its hierarchical organization of center-periphery. It is this initial step that Quijano would 
formalize with his concept of the colonial matrix of power, which I will examine below. 
On the other hand, modernity/coloniality has also emerged through the engagement with 
other, non-Western ways of knowing and doing. This thinking from and with the 
dominated bodies and communities, rather than just thinking about their geopolitical 
relationships and histories internal to a universalized capitalist-modernity, is what allows 
theories of modernity/coloniality to function not simply as critique, but as new productive 
horizons through which to imagine new ways of knowing and doing. Hence, for Walter 
Mignolo, decolonial thought is both analytic and prospective, concerned with “the 
analytic [critique] of coloniality…and building communities based on a vision of a 
society that delinks from coloniality” in favour of decoloniality (Further Thoughts 35). 
Here the genealogy of modernity/coloniality and decolonial thought opens up beyond 
Latin America to embrace a global frame that interrelates histories of capitalist expansion 
and colonial forms of social organization with histories of resistance. Of particular 
importance to my thesis will be the ways in which modernity/coloniality/decoloniality 
opens up spaces for Caribbean and Black diasporic thought, Indigenous thought, and 
Latina/o thought - though we should refrain from conceptualizing any of these traditions 
as uniform objects while being attentive to their similarities as well as differences. 
Rather, they constitute what Mignolo refers to as “universes of meaning” grounding the 
articulation of intellectual projects anchored in specific histories, cosmologies, and ways 
of living, which we shall see function as autopoietic organizations capable of connecting 
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across difference in new relationalities beyond modernity/coloniality (Further Thoughts 
21). 
 Thus, it is important to acknowledge that while 
modernity/coloniality/decoloniality as an intellectual project works on a global level 
through shared theoretical operations to open up spaces for various colonized 
knowledges, its specificity with regards to both critique and new horizons of knowing 
and doing occurs under distinct forms of domination and vulnerability that structure its 
theoretical insights. That is to say, while theories of modernity/coloniality/decoloniality 
make room for both Black critique as well as Indigenous thought, the specificity of the 
histories and forms of domination undergone by both mean that their engagement takes 
place through concrete political-epistemic relationships, and that their separate insights 
need to be read alongside each other in order to fully critique the modern/colonial 
organization of power, knowledge and bodies. As I will argue, this means, ultimately, 
that knowledge production must be conceptualized as an embodied practice, a 
relationship that brings to the fore the necessary socio-poetics of knowledge that can 
connect thinking and doing to decoloniality as an epistemic-political project. Importantly, 
this will involve an engagement with both different forms of embodiment, such as 
Blackness and Indigeneity, as well as the histories and structures of colonialism that 
relate to them, such as extractive- and settler-colonial regimes. It is from these concrete 
histories that modernity/coloniality/decoloniality seeks a point of complex solidarity, 
rather than attempting to be a new abstract universal theory capable of explaining every 
situation. The goal, in other words, is to make a theory that is accountable to colonized 
and racialized communities, rather than an accounting of them. 
 Following philosopher Nelson Maldonado-Torres I will argue that “my use of 
modernity/coloniality here refers mainly to the idea that it is necessary always to 
historicize and theorize modernity with the concept of coloniality in mind” (Césaire’s 
Gift 439). What is coloniality? While a more thorough examination will take up the rest 
of this introduction, we can begin with Walter Mignolo’s statement that “coloniality 
names the underlying logic of the foundation and unfolding of Western civilization from 
the Renaissance to today of which historical colonialisms have been a constitutive, 
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although downplayed, dimension” (Darker 2). Importantly, this logic extends beyond 
instances of historical and neo- colonialisms to institute a systematic ordering of power, 
knowledge, and bodies “by way of which the entire planet, including its continental 
division…becomes articulated in such production of knowledge and classificatory 
apparatus” to articulate and legitimize the epistemic and socio-political arrangements 
needed for the expansion of Western colonial-capitalism (Local 17). 
Modernity/coloniality then is an understanding of the world-system as an interrelated 
field of power, knowledge, and being which is organized along internal and external 
borders that translate differences into values for the purpose of ordering a world for the 
few at the expense of the many. It is in the apprehension of the existence of the 
modern/colonial world system, the historicization of modernity via coloniality, that opens 
up the theoretical space for decoloniality. Importantly, however, it should not be assumed 
that decolonial desires, knowledges and projects are dependent on their recognition by 
institutionalized forms of knowledge. Rather, in different localized colonial 
organizations, decoloniality is grounded in the survival and resurgence of other orders of 
life and their cosmologies. That is why these orders can be referred to as autonomous 
though entangled: while subject since sixteenth century to colonial domination, existing 
in complex relations of cross-cultural contact, there nonetheless persist histories and 
world views that escape capture, and which continuing regimes of colonial power are 
focused on eradicating. What the theorization of modernity/coloniality does is open up 
space for an engagement with these cosmologies and memories via decoloniality so as to 
critique the structures of domination and violence that have contributed to their 
eradication and marginalization.  
 Decoloniality according to Mignolo “is neither the equivalent of disciplinary 
knowledge nor (for decolonial thinkers) an object of study…neither a discipline nor a 
method” (Further Thoughts 33). Instead, according Nelson Maldonado-Torres, the 
decolonial turn “refers to a shift in knowledge production” that “introduces questions 
about the effects of colonization in modern subjectivities and modern forms of life as 
well as contributions of racialized and colonized subjectivities to the production of 
knowledge and critical thinking” (Coloniality 116). In light of these questions, 
Maldonado-Torres argues that decolonization “refers to the task of building an alternative 
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world to modernity…[and] to the construction of a new horizon of meaning that includes 
new conceptions about the human being and material relations that do not conform to the 
dictatorship of capital and that are not limited by the empire of law in the 
modern/colonial nation-state form” (Césaire’s Gift 439-40). In other words, it is, as 
Sylvia Wynter argues, the construction of “an alternative process of making ourselves 
human; and to free the Western concept of humanism from its tribal aspect of We and the 
Other, transforming its abstract universal premise into the concretely human global, the 
concretely WE” (Socio-poetics 89). Importantly, this global concern is predicated on the 
proliferation of local interventions at various points of antagonism within the 
modern/colonial world system. It is these local interventions, each with its own valence, 
its own histories of colonial power and resistance, its own cosmologies and memories, 
that will work to structure solidarity across the global order and open up space for a new 
practice of being human.  
 In light of the importance of the local, and its imbrication with the global, the 
question emerges as to what, exactly, organizes these concerns across the multiple points 
of knowing and doing represented by diverse decolonial thinkers, of which the ones 
mentioned above are only a small sample, and many of whom may articulate their 
thinking with little to no concrete reference to modernity/coloniality/decoloniality as a set 
of terms or project. That is, how does decoloniality understand not only itself as a project, 
but the terms against which it articulates this project, namely ‘modernity’ and 
‘coloniality’, the latter being linked to such concepts as the coloniality of power, 
knowledge, and being with which this thesis is concerned? And how does this 
understanding of global ordering relate to the concrete embodied forms of humanity that 
decoloniality seeks to connect? I will now turn to a brief overview of these terms in order 
to articulate an understanding of decoloniality as a critical project. Furthermore, I will 
end by arguing that, if decolonial thought is to be neither a method nor a discipline, not 
an object of inquiry but a horizon of meaning, then poetics itself is a necessary concept 
for understanding the way in which diverse positions, communities and histories can be 
articulated within this horizon in order to give decoloniality its necessary purchase as a 
defined, though fluid, project linking the autopoietic self-organization of autonomous-
though-entangled communities and cosmologies. Furthermore, poetics will provide a 
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means of connecting language to embodied experiences and grounding both in the 
material, epistemic-political contexts that give them meaning.  
 The relationship between communities as distinct social formations entangled 
with their own cosmologies and modes of knowing can be thought through the work of 
Humberto Maturana and Franciso Varela. In The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological 
Roots of Human Understanding (1987), Maturana and Varela set out to define the 
relationship between biological processes and human cognition. While I will return to 
their work in later chapters, what is necessary for now is to understand several key 
concepts. First, they define the organism, any living organism, as a self-organizing 
autonomous unity. This self-organizing unity thereby conceives of the organism’s 
relationship to the world as one in which the organization of the organism, its specific 
structural coherence, creates its world by interpreting the signals which it receives via 
external stimulus. Furthermore, this creation and interaction is selected for so as to 
maintain the organism’s unity and operational coherence. Importantly, this means that the 
concept of autonomy here should not be understood as an absolute freedom or agency. 
Rather, it is an active negotiation of internal and external relationships that link subjects 
to their environment, including other subjects, in a necessary and yet contingent way - 
necessary for sustenance while contingent in the possible organizations of life sustaining 
activity. This, then, is the second point, that of autopoietic self-creation, whereby the 
organism in its interaction with the environment via its incorporation of external stimuli 
grows and changes in relation to its own structure. Third, the organism can engage in 
relationships of structural coupling with its environment or other organisms, such that 
their autonomous forms of self-organization grow together in a mutual process capable of 
establishing higher order unities - though whether these unities are arranged via 
hierarchies of domination or tend towards more harmonious forms of co-existence is 
something that can only be ascertained in each concrete situation. This leads to the final 
concept, that of social and linguistic coupling, which defines human interaction as 
distinct from other forms of structural coupling. It is through linguistic coupling that 
humans learn to reflect on social interactions, leading to their ability to reflect on 
themselves and others so as to produce distinct identities and specific modes of social 
organization. It is from this process that Maturana and Varela argue that all knowing is 
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doing, as all cognition is related to one’s interaction with external stimuli within the 
shared space of our created worlds.  
 Humanity is thus both biological and socio-linguistic, and the human is, as 
Wynter says, a hybrid being, both bios and logos (Ceremony Found 196). However, as 
Wynter argues, the particular forms of human being, that is, its social organization along 
with the narratives by which that society constructs its self-understanding, produce 
distinct “genres of the human” within concrete relations of structural coupling (ibid). 
What is important is not that Maturana and Varela, or Wynter for that matter, construct a 
model of humanity that is either biologically or culturally determined. Rather, what they 
do is to draw attention to the ways in which the human subject is inherently social, and 
within this sociality how human groups construct the material and symbolic worlds in 
which they live. These worlds are themselves open to internal and external changes 
however, as new structural couplings produce new perturbations, which result in changes 
to the internal coherence of material and symbolic relations. What is important is that at 
any given moment, these worlds draw on, or formalize, only some of the structural 
possibilities available to them. As we shall see, in the case of a colonial situation, these 
structural formations are subsumed to the material and symbolic needs of the dominating 
group, but through active decolonial resistance, alternative formations that draw on 
different structural reservoirs are possible.  
 In order to understand modernity/coloniality, we must consider the process by 
which European and non-European practices of humanity were brought into relations of 
structural coupling. Walter Mignolo argues that the various local instances of colonialism 
exist within a larger history going back to the Spanish conquest of the Americas, and that 
this colonial relation of consumption, built off of the “exploitation of labor and 
expropriation of land” is constitutive of European modernity (Local 7). Mignolo sees 
such relationships as being at the heart of three breakthroughs in Western society that 
occurred as it expanded its global reach. These three breakthroughs were: the creation of 
the capitalist economy, with its colonial and imperial entanglements; the changes in 
knowledge from the Renaissance onward that led to the scientific revolution; and the 
disposability of human life, the basis upon which the colonies were exploited and 
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consumed at the expense of their original and displaced inhabitants. By tying the 
historical achievements of Western society (capitalism and science) to its colonial history 
(disposability), Mignolo reveals that “hidden behind the rhetoric of modernity, economic 
practices dispensed with human lives, and knowledge justified racism and the inferiority 
of human lives that were naturally considered dispensable” (6). This creates a 
dichotomous relationship in which two separate spaces are constructed, structured by 
their own internal logics: the colony as the space of consumption and waste, and the 
metropole as the space where consumption turns into accumulation and agency, 
colonialism into modernity, body into intellect. Knowledge and culture become means of 
displacing this relationship, naturalizing and legitimizing it by making them appear 
unconnected, a process which modernity/coloniality rejoins, placing the colonial and 
modern spaces into the historical context which is their shared horizon. As we will see in 
our discussion of the figure of Imperial Man, this process of consumption and 
accumulation, and the structures of power and knowledge that buttress it, produce a 
normative form of humanity that is Western, white, and male. As Sylvia Wynter argues, 
what emerged from these breakthroughs as they decomposed and recomposed the old 
order of European society on a world scale was a “new relation to Nature and other men, 
[which] metamorphosed Western man and his sense of self” as “for the first time in 
human history a small group of peoples now had at their disposal the rest of the peoples 
and resources of the earth” even as this new relationship was naturalized and justified in 
relation to abstract truths unfolding the universal progress of history (Sociopoetics 82). 
 Thus, when two cultures meet, their entanglements across their historical 
autonomous developments can be understood as a form of structural coupling. However, 
in the modern/colonial world system, this is done in a relationship in which one 
autonomous unity is dominated and consumed by the other, a process of what I would 
like to call, highlighting its material and biologically embodied basis, colonial 
consumption. The process of colonial consumption can be thought of in terms similar to 
Ann Laura Stoler's work on ruination: “Ruination is an act perpetrated, a condition to 
which one is subject, and a cause of loss. Each has its own temporality. Each identifies 
different durations and moments of exposure to a range of violences and degradations 
that may be immediate or delayed, subcutaneous or visible, prolonged or instant, diffuse 
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or direct” (Stoler, 11).  Ruination provides a way of connecting and thinking through 
different moments and modalities of the same process. Furthermore, she argues that this 
is a dynamic process, as “our focus is less on the noun ruin than on ‘ruination’ as an 
active, ongoing process that allocates imperial debris differentially and ruin as a violent 
verb that unites apparently disparate moments, places, and objects” (7). By tying colonial 
consumption to ruination, I wish to expand its conceptual range by seeing it not as a static 
relation between two fixed points, but as a dynamic interaction of flows and structures 
through which an unequal relationship is established that strengthens one party while 
ruining the other, and in doing so turns the colonized into disposable material for the 
West’s own project of accumulation and progress. Ruination as a concept thus allows us 
to see colonial consumption as a joining of two seemingly distinct and opposed logics: 
that of Eurocentric modernity and that of colonization as a structural coupling which 
produces a shared world through colonial consumption. 
 It is from within this understanding of colonial consumption that I will now turn 
to an examination of the conceptual core of modernity/coloniality/decoloniality. First, 
key to understanding decoloniality is a critique of the ‘rhetoric of Modernity’ that has 
been, by and large, the dominant way of understanding and legitimizing the global order 
of modernity/coloniality. This rhetoric can be thought through three interrelated concepts: 
salvation, universal history, and the view from nowhere. As I explore the meaning that 
these concepts have for modernity, they will begin in their very elaboration to point 
toward the underlying structure of coloniality that organizes the modern/colonial world-
system. 
 The concept of salvation is essential to the constitution and legitimation of the 
modern/colonial world system. It is via the concept of salvation that Western colonial-
capitalist ways of knowing and doing are able to present themselves as objective truth, as 
a model at the forefront of the progressive advancement of humanity and that necessarily 
must be followed by all others in their own cultural and social evolution towards the truth 
such that “coloniality [is] justified as the unavoidable necessity to modernize the world” 
(Further Thoughts 25). As Mignolo argues, this concept has had many forms over the 
years, successively changing as the basis of the West’s self-conception itself evolved 
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from “the rhetoric of Christianization, civilization, progress, development, [to] market 
democracy” (Delinking 317). This rhetoric was examined by Manning Marable as central 
to his understanding of the process of Western economic development in relation to third-
world underdevelopment, as it supplied “the pattern by which nonwhite people transform 
themselves” through commercialization and industrialization, “moving toward the 
standard socioeconomic models provided by Western Europe and the United States” (2-
3). Modernity/coloniality/decoloniality build on this economic base to assert that with the 
socioeconomic model comes an overall model of epistemic-political normativity. Thus, 
“‘modernity’ is a complex narrative whose point of origin was Europe; a narrative that 
builds Western civilization by celebrating its achievements while hiding at the same time 
its darker side, ‘coloniality.’ Coloniality in other words is constitutive of modernity” even 
as modernity is narrativized as a promise of salvation (Darker 2-3). 
 This narrative, of central importance to the rhetoric of salvation, was formalized 
through creation of a unilinear history, and Mignolo argues that “the colonization of time 
and the institution of the temporal colonial difference were crucial for the narratives of 
modernity as salvation, emancipation and progress” (Delinking 324). This linear model 
of time, grounding itself in an appropriation of Greek and Roman antiquity, extends 
“roughly from the sixteenth century until the beginning of the nineteenth century” and 
ends with “the building of modernity” (Local 50). In this linear view, colonialism forms 
the past of the modern world, a series of relationships that have been transcended, 
whether justly or not. This unilinear model of time is one in which “time was conceived 
and naturalized as both the measure of human history (modernity) and the time-scale of 
human beings (primitives) in their distance with modernity” (153). History thus emerges 
as the colonization of time, as a means of translating the original differences between 
religious cultures in Christianity to the articulation of these differences as values within a 
unitary concept of progressive history. As a global culture, this meant that “History as 
‘time’ entered into the picture to place societies in an imaginary chronological line going 
from nature to culture, from barbarism to civilization following a progressive destination 
to some point of arrival” (151). Ultimately, the unilinear construction of time creates “a 
comparative point of view that allows for the erasure or devaluation of other forms of 
knowledge” (172). 
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 The result of this historical narrative of modernity as salvation and the 
comparative view it instantiates is a political-epistemic construction of knowledge 
production as a detached process that is about the world, a form of control that is called 
‘the hubris of the zero point’. This results in a view of humanity in which some ways of 
knowing and doing are valued as normative representations of universal being while 
others come to signify those ‘left behind’ by history, those who need to be redeemed by 
the rhetoric of modernity. The view from nowhere emerges from the subject of this 
universal history as the pure subject of abstract universal knowledge; it is the 
construction of a subject that is modern, thus saved by and furthering the myth of unitary 
history. Ramon Grosfoguel argues that the hubris of the zero point as a model of 
subjectivity was codified with Descartes and is built on solipsism and a dualism that 
separated the mind, a transcendent reason, from the body, profane matter (Grosfoguel, 
88). This creates the concept of a universality “in which the epistemic subject has no 
sexuality, gender, ethnicity, race, class, spirituality, language, or epistemic location 
within power relations, and a subject that produces truth from an interior monologue with 
himself without relation to anyone outside him.” (89). This universality is the epistemic 
loci of enunciation that was exported through modernity as the only viable point from 
which knowledge could be organized, legitimizing and obscuring its entanglements with 
relations of coloniality. As we shall see momentarily, this entanglement was one of 
violence, and the ability to present knowledge as de-localized, universal, abstract is tied 
to social-historical processes of domination.  
 For now however, we must see that the result of the rhetoric of modernity is a 
split between different human subjects in an unequal structural coupling. On the one side 
are those who are the subjects of universal history and salvation, the producers of 
universal knowledge. These are whom Mignolo calls humanitas: “those who manage 
categories of thought and knowledge production to use that managerial authority to assert 
themselves by disqualifying those who…are classified as deficient, rationally and 
ontologically” (Darker 82). Those others, cast out from history and in need of salvation 
are the anthropos “who at once are barbarians and traditional” barred from universal 
history and the ability to have their ways of knowing and doing validated as truth (82). 
Similarly, Sylvia Wynter places this relationship within what she calls the current 
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economic-biocentric conception of Man that relies on a “systemically - including 
epistemically - produced role of ‘otherness’” to produce a naturalized, biologically 
absolute, genre of humanity in which some (Western) forms of knowing and doing are 
overrepresented at the expense of others whose exploitation and domination are justified 
(Ceremony Found 196). It is important to note that while both Mignolo and Wynter’s 
conceptions of this relationship are grounded in the universe of meaning that is 
modernity/coloniality/decoloniality, they do so from different perspectives, different 
histories of structural coupling. On the one hand, Mignolo, writing from South America, 
has taken up the majority of his theorizing from the perspectives and histories of the 
Spanish conquest and Amerindian resistance; hence his formulation of the relationship 
between humanitas and anthropos in terms of tradition understood as a static cultural 
practice, as this was the means by which the Spanish differentiated themselves from the 
Indigenous nations in order to justify their colonial projects. Conversely, writing from 
Jamaica in relation to histories of slavery and the Black radical tradition, Wynter 
formulates the relationship between Western man and others through the biosocial 
construction of race as an ordering of humanity that posits a norm via its maintenance of 
a liminal space beyond which humanity is no more. In other words, Blackness as the 
abject base against which the West’s genre of the human defines its normativity. What is 
important in each case, however, is that the relationship between these genres of the 
human be conceived as forms of structural coupling which I have termed colonial 
consumption, and which deny the autopoietic autonomy of subjects whose knowing and 
doing are grounded in the construction of shared worlds. In reaching this point however, 
where we can begin to see the ways in which the views advanced by the rhetoric of 
modernity are grounded in concrete relations of domination, we have begun to move 
toward the next key concept, that of the logic of coloniality. 
 The key concept tying together the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of 
coloniality is the colonial matrix of power, first theorized by Anibal Quijano and then 
taken up by Mignolo and others. According to Mignolo: “I would venture to say that the 
four interrelated spheres of the colonial matrix of power (economy, authority, gender and 
sexuality, and knowledge/subjectivity) operate at the level of the enunciated, while 
patriarchy and racism ground the enunciation in both actors and institutions” (Darker 
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Side124). At the level of the enunciated these domains are “interrelated spheres of 
management and control” that constitute the world order through their development of 
knowledge in service of colonial consumption (8). These domains are supported by “the 
racial and patriarchal foundation of knowledge (the enunciation)” which structure the 
coupling of diverse communities in the modern/colonial world (8). This means that 
“knowledge is not just something that accounts for (describes, narrates, explains, 
interprets) and allows the knower to sit outside the observed domain” but “that 
knowledge itself is an integral part of imperial processes of appropriation” (205, 
emphasis in original). As a form of structural coupling between autopoietic unities, “the 
colonial matrix of power is built and operates on a series of interconnected heterogeneous 
historico-structural nodes, bounded by the ‘/‘ that divides and unites 
modernity/coloniality, imperial laws/colonial rules, center/peripheries, that are the 
consequences of global linear thinking in the foundation of the modern/colonial world” 
(Darker 16-17). As we have seen, the colonial matrix of power orders humanity on a 
hierarchical system from civilized humanitas to barbaric anthropos, incorporating through 
structural coupling alternative forms of life into its self-organization in a way that 
legitimizes and naturalizes a world organized by and for colonial consumption while 
obstructing the autopoietic autonomy of those it incorporates. 
 From the colonial matrix of power emerges the next important decolonial concept, 
that of the colonial difference. First theorized by Mignolo, the colonial difference refers 
to the divide between modernity and coloniality that is instituted by colonial 
consumption. As Nelson Maldonado-Torres argues, the colonial difference occurs at 
different levels, that of knowledge and that of being. The colonial difference in terms of 
knowledge concerns the election of Western ways of knowing the world to the status of 
universal truth, in which European history and life ways become the transcendental 
horizon from which all meaning must be articulated. It is important to realize that not 
only does this subalternize alternative ways of knowing, but it in fact contributes to the 
objectification of the communities who practice these alternative forms of knowledge 
production, fitting them into a world order of knowledge controlled by Western designs. 
The colonial difference is the means by which the ways of being in the centre are 
distanced and held as distinct and superior to those in the periphery while concealing 
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their interrelatedness. As Walter Mignolo argues “until the middle of the twentieth 
century the colonial difference honoured the classical distinction that was valid for early 
forms of colonialism” of center-periphery (Local xxv). With the expansion of global 
capitalism however, Mignolo posits a global colonialism that “keeps on reproducing the 
colonial difference on a world scale, although without being located in one particular 
nation-state” (xxvi). Further, this is supported by and in turn supports the asymmetrical 
nature of global designs, that is, that knowledge is produced in socio-historical and 
political-epistemic contexts that “responded to the needs of the First not of the Third 
World” (Darker 129). The colonial difference of knowledge highlights the practices of 
knowing that contribute to and justify the autopoietic production of a society formed by 
the structural coupling of autonomous unities within the logic of coloniality. Thus 
“although knowledge-making is a common human endeavour…the racialization of places 
and people in the formation and transformation of the colonial matrix of power not only 
established hierarchical ranking between languages and categories of thought, but also 
built economic and political structures of domination and oppression based on the 
geopolitical and hierarchical organization of knowledge” (141). 
 Coloniality is related not only to knowledge, but to the bodies that produce those 
knowledges as well: “coloniality of power, in a nutshell, worked as an epistemic 
mechanism that classified people around the world…by colour and territories, and 
managed (and still manages) the distribution of labour and the organization of society” 
for Western projects of accumulation via colonial consumption (Darker 216). As a result, 
“in the colonial matrix of power such classifications are bestowed on bodies, in a 
combination of racism and patriarchy” that takes the European male as its basis (318-9). 
This body is sustained by systems of violent domination that renders other forms of life, 
other embodied ways of knowing and living together in the world, vulnerable to the point 
of disposability, unlivable and unthinkable. Through the colonial matrix of power’s 
structuring of discourses and material relations, certain bodies are produced as invisible 
or hyper-visible, disposable and vulnerable, incapable of translating their experience into 
knowledge, or of exercising any form of agency that is not derivative of their assimilative 
performance of dominant practices of autopoiesis. According to Maldonado-Torres 
“coloniality of Being refers to…the production of a world in which exceptions to ethical 
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relationships become the norm” (Coloniality 113). Importantly, “that being has a colonial 
aspect means that in addition to positing itself as autonomous and being driven by 
preservation, it tries to obliterate the traces” of its unequal structural coupling “by 
actually giving birth to a world in which lordship and supremacy rather than generous 
interaction define social dynamics” (113).  
 The subject of this social dynamic, the subject of colonial consumption and the 
autopoietic production of humanity in modernity/coloniality, I will call Imperial Man. 
What this figure does is tie the hubris of the zero point as the loci of enunciation of the 
subject produced by the coloniality of knowledge, to the history of colonialism, conquest, 
and genocide that made up the process of colonial consumption as a structural coupling. 
Thus, Imperial Being is the subject whose power, agency, and worldview are based on 
processes of colonial consumption, and yet who is able to displace and legitimize the 
unequal aspect of this reality through a universal reason that negates all other ways of 
knowing and being. In the end, from the material-symbolic production of a specific 
normative body emerges reality in which the human is “now reified into a commodity” 
dependent on the mediation of its agency by structures of domination and the narratives 
of transcendent history that justify them (Socio-Poetics 87). This connection between the 
socio-historical aspects of violent domination and the political-epistemic relations arising 
from it within the logic of coloniality is important, as it ties knowledge production and 
language to both the body and violence. Recognizing this, Maldonado-Torres argues that, 
as a concept, “coloniality of being would make primary reference to the lived experience 
of colonization and its impact on language” (Coloniality 96). 
 This relationship of the body to language, violence and community, returns us to 
Maturana and Varela’s biological and social understanding of cognition, a recognition 
that can, with reference to the work of Mignolo and Lewis Gordon, work to bring us to 
the place of poetics in decoloniality, and its relationship to autopoiesis. In The Darker 
Side of Western Modernity (2010) Mignolo puts forth his basic model of the decolonial 
subject’s relation to knowledge production, building on the work of Emile Benveniste. 
Mignolo begins by affirming Benveniste’s formal apparatus of enunciation, which starts 
with the distinction between the enunciator and the enunciated; it is then formed on the 
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basis of the pronominal system of language and the spatial deitics or markers that 
structure the enunciation in relation to a specifically positioned enunciator. Then, “the 
extension of linguistic theory and analysis from the sentence to discourse prompted the 
introduction of discursive frames or conversation frames” that, when given formal and 
institutional mediation can become ‘scholarly disciplines’ that organize and regulate 
knowledge production within specific cosmologies (124-5). Ultimately, “the linguistic 
institutional foundation, management, and practices that knowledge-making brings 
allows [Mignolo] to extend Benveniste’s formal apparatus of enunciation…focusing on 
the borders between the Western..foundation of knowledge and understanding…and its 
confrontation with knowledge-making in non-European languages and institutions” 
(126). In this context education and the management of knowledge take on a specific 
importance as  “institutions are created that accomplish two functions: training the new 
(epistemically obedient) members, and controlling who enters and what knowledge-
making is allowed, disavowed, devalued, or celebrated” (141). All knowledge production 
is thus formed from embodied subjects in relation to larger institutional structures of 
knowledge that legitimize and reproduce founding cosmologies, mediated through socio-
linguistic practices. 
 Important to make sense of Mignolo’s larger structure of the body within 
cosmology as the locus of enunciation for decolonial thought, which seeks to position 
that thought outside of the institutionalized bounds of coloniality, is the concept of 
disciplinary decadence. Disciplinary decadence is a concept advanced by Lewis R. 
Gordon as a way of critiquing forms of knowing that merely describe the world through a 
set of fixed disciplinary norms which, over time, have become separated from the body as 
a grounding in social reality. While we shall see in subsequent chapters what replaces this 
stagnant view of the body-knowledge relation in decolonial theory - namely the notion of 
knowledge as grounded in the body and community as autopoietic systems in continual 
processes of translation and transformation - for now I will simply explore Gordon’s 
concept and how it relates to coloniality. Disciplinary decadence, Gordon argues, “is the 
ontologizing or reification of a discipline.…Its assertion as absolute eventually leads to 
no room for other disciplinary perspectives, the result of which is the rejection of them 
for not being one’s own” (4-5). This leads to two consequences, one on the level of the 
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subject and one on the level of knowledge production itself. On the level of the subject 
Gordon argues that “in such an attitude, we treat our discipline as though it was never 
born and has always existed and will never change or, in some cases, die. More than 
immortal, it is eternal. Yet as something that came into being, it lives, in such an attitude, 
as a monstrosity” (4). This projection of an immortal, ungrounded knowledge, an abstract 
knowledge that occurs ‘out there’ with no connection to living society is thus the 
manifestation of the zero-point of knowledge as projected by a coloniality of being that 
seeks to deny the social basis of humanity. Indeed, as Gordon further argues “what 
disappears is the possibility of a shared public space, a world outside the self” (6). In the 
denial of shared space and the valorization of a form of knowing and doing that is 
abstract and eternal, disciplinary decadence is thus the institutionalized thought of 
Imperial Man. The effect for knowledge production is that “if one’s discipline has 
foreclosed the question of its scope, all that is left for it is a form of ‘applied’ work. Such 
work militates against thinking” (5). More than that, I would argue, such work militates 
against thinking in the name of the construction of restrictive forms of knowing and 
doing that uphold colonial consumption. This is because, as a denial of social reality, 
disciplinary decadence is not merely solipsistic for the knower, but, since “the 
performative contradiction in denying social reality is that ‘denial’ is communicative, is 
outward directed, even where the reference is to the self…in other words, a social 
rejection of the social” in the name of a restrictive human nature it “leads to the notion of 
law like structures on human action before such actions are made” (18). When these 
structures are grounded in the maintenance of coloniality, what emerges is the coloniality 
of knowledge and being as the body is related to knowledge through its denial of social 
embodiment in the name of the abstract truth of Imperial Man. 
 Importantly, the colonial difference on the levels of both being and knowledge 
allow us to articulate a relationship between embodied experience, social organization via 
structural couplings, and knowledge production so as to understand with Mignolo that 
“facts and events have meaning once they are incorporated into universes of meaning and 
universes of meaning cross the body” (Further Thoughts 26). That is, as Vallega argues, 
there is an aesthetic dimension to modernity/coloniality that not only orders bodies in 
their relations, but in their internalized dispositions. Noting that, in modernity/coloniality, 
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“living desire becomes the function of the production and preservation of power within 
the system” leaving no room for other forms of life, Vallega argues that the aesthetic 
emerges as a field of struggle in which the dispositions and sensibilities that normalize 
domination can be questioned and transformed (71). This is not, he claims, a call to 
irrationality, but to link knowledge production and political projects to the “living 
manifestations of distinct peoples” as a way of being attentive to “the time-space that 
must be constantly recovered for the sake of the expression, transformation, and opening 
to the potentiality of our communities” (73). In an online article co-written with Rolando 
Vasquez, Mignolo charts how the aesthetic, via cultural production, can also achieve a 
state of disciplinary decadence, arguing that “modern aestheTics have played a key role 
in configuring a canon, a normativity that enabled the disdain and the rejection of other 
forms of aesthetic practices, or, more precisely, other forms of aestheSis, of sensing and 
perceiving” (Mignolo and Vasquez). The spread of aesthetics as a global concept was tied 
to processes that devalued other ways of being and sensing: “modern aestheTics have 
served as a mechanism to produce and regulate sensibilities” (ibid).  In this way, 
knowledge and art, literature and language, became separated from their grounding 
within localized European autonomies to become abstract means of thinking about and 
representing the world. And, within the emerging modern/colonial world system an 
abstract commodified culture tied to the disciplinary decadence of Imperial Man became 
“the agent and product of the process by which objects invent man as another object 
labeled human [and] Man’s power to name objects is turned against him” thereby 
removing people’s agency to transform their material-symbolic existence into a 
legitimized form of knowing and constructing community (Socio-Poetics 87).  
 Against this, decoloniality advocates a form of knowing from/with the body. This 
is a form of knowing that would take seriously Gordon’s assertion that “the human is, in 
other words, lived, and it is creatively so” (Disciplinary 18). In this frame, one would 
acknowledge that “disciplines are functions of the living reality on which they rest, 
namely, living societies. As social conditions for the life of disciplines decline, so, too, do 
disciplines” (8). Against stagnation Gordon advocates “the lived reality of thinking as 
reflective thought on thinkers and thought…the task of making thinking a living activity 
often requires acts of disruption” (6). Following from this, Wynter proposes poetry as 
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“the agent and product by which man names the world, and calling it into being, invents 
his human as opposed to his ‘natural’ being” as an “active relation” (Socio-poetics 87). It 
is this conception of poetics as an active, embodied activity, an expression of living 
thought grounded in the body and in the recovery or valorization of ways of life as the 
grounds of knowledge production, that I will now take up through the concept of an 
insurgent poetics, wherein the poem is seen as a production of autopoiesis capable of 
articulating a structural coupling disruptive of the logic of coloniality.  
 As John Beverley argues “literature used in this way can serve as a kind of 
‘contact zone’ where previously disarticulated subject positions, social projects, and 
energies may come together” (Beverley xiii). For José Rabasa, this contact zone is 
thought of as an “insurgent aesthetics [which] calls for the smashing of everything sacred 
without invoking an end” (Rabasa 261). Rabasa goes on to argue that “the spirit of 
insurgency in which there is endless invention of new forms of expression” can ground 
poetics such that “we ought to think of insurgencies as carrying deep transformations in 
the common sense of a given class, society, historical moment, or culture” (263, 279). 
Rabasa’s argument that “we ought to think aesthetics as a pure domain - the ought is not 
simply a moral injunction but a revolutionary ethos” becomes a form reading poetics as a 
contact zone that suspends hegemonic formations to point to new orders of humanity and 
rationality (263). Thus “the immanence of struggles constitutes their singularity and 
necessary specificity” (99). This immanence, when concretized in the poem as a contact 
zone, functions as a “field force which reinterprets and reinvents anew the meaning of the 
sign; that is, the poem creates anew the sign” (Socio-Poetics 88). Ultimately, an insurgent 
poetics functions as an autopoietic act in language such that “to name, to create a sign, is 
to conceptualize, to draw into a universe of meaning” the embodied experience of the 
writer and the reader in a poem “created as a new cultural form as an accusation against 
cultural destitution, and as the dynamic of revolt” (88-9). Against the attribution of 
agency to Imperial Man as a representative of History or Truth, Wynter’s call for socio-
poetics as a means of finding alternative ways of making ourselves human, of drawing 
language, including our linguistic constructions of the self, into new cosmologies, 
functions to focus on agency as a result of humanity’s hybrid being as logos and bios. In 
doing so, the naturalized process of colonial consumption is disrupted by an insurgent 
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poetics, though what will take its place is up to the structural coupling and autopoietic 
self-organization of the participants. 
 My foray into decolonial poetics will thus take up this model of the poem as an 
insurgent contact zone, that challenges the reader from a concrete positionality, fracturing 
his or her disciplinary assumptions while pointing to the articulation of difficult 
solidarities. Thus, in this insurgent moment there occurs “the confrontation through the 
text of one person (the reader and/or the interlocutor) with another at the level of a 
possible solidarity and unity (a unity in which differences will be respected)” (Beverley 
80). Thus, the poem as autopoietic structural coupling “involves a series of negotiations 
between different subject positions and their legitimizing discourses” (104). A key 
question that will emerge in my discussion of decolonial poetics then is this: what can be 
gained in seeing poetry as an autopoietic practice outside of, or at least destabilizing of, 
its disciplinary formation. That is, how can poetics as an embodied practice of “making 
ourselves human” help to conceive of knowledge production as a form of thinking 
from/with rather than for/about?  
 This concept of the poem as an insurgent form of knowing and doing, a thinking 
from/with rather than about, is important for several reasons. First, in positioning the poet 
as a concrete subject, who constructs the poem as a transformation of their world into a 
linguistic act, poetry can be seen in terms of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls a 
“rearguard theory” grounded in the “experiences of large, marginalized minorities and 
majorities that struggle against unjustly imposed marginality and inferiority, with the 
purpose of strengthening their resistance” (Sousa Santos ix). Secondly, in the poem’s 
need to interpellate its reader into a relationship in the shared construction of meaning, a 
mode of thinking with, posits knowing and doing as a poetic cum autopoietic activity, as 
meaning is constructed in the coupling between the worlds of the reader and the poet 
through the poem without the possibility of referring to any transcendent, abstract truth 
that would fix the play of meaning. Finally, from this, any pretensions on the reader’s 
part to the hubris of the zero point are destabilized, and they are asked to engage in an 
ethical relation to the world that the poem seeks to transform. What emerges is “a frame 
in which literary practice will not be conceived as an object of study (aesthetic, linguistic, 
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or sociological) but as production of theoretical knowledge; not as ‘representation’ of 
something, society or ideas, but as a reflection in its own way about issues of human and 
historical concern, including language” (Local 223). From the poem itself, as a linguistic 
act turned object, emerges an articulation of poetics as a means of thinking from/with, 
grounding knowledge production as an autopoietic activity on a global scale within the 
frame of decoloniality. Thus, poetics is neither science nor theory, but a practice 
producing worlds outside of, or in excess to, the coherence of Imperial Man. 
 I will now give a brief overview of the following chapters. First, I will turn to the 
poetry and thought of Aimé Césaire in order to examine the philosophical anthropology 
of the decolonial subject. Starting from the history of colonialism and slavery in the 
Caribbean I will read Césaire in relation to Cedric Robinson’s Black radical tradition and 
the way in which Césaire engages the embodied experience of Blackness. Turning to 
Mignolo’s concept of the geo- and bio- politics of knowledge, I will argue that the 
decolonial subject rests on an understanding of the human as bios and logos that 
creatively exceeds the structures of knowledge in the modern/colonial world in an act of 
thinking from the Black body. 
 In the second chapter I will look to Chilean poet Cecelia Vicuña and the space of 
the border as the site from which decoloniality enacts a metacritique of reason. Looking 
to the ways in which space is actualized by social-political organizations as an 
autopoietic field, I will argue that modernity/coloniality works by instituting an abstract 
space that subsumes localities to the need of colonial consumption. Against forms of 
cultural governance which seek to solidify this process, I will look to the space of the 
border as a space in which bodies are placed in proximity and directed toward their co-
human need to sustain alternative forms of life as a mode of thinking with those in the 
border. 
 In the third chapter I will look to Mohawk poet Beth Brant and the possibility of a 
decolonial ethics of political liberation. Looking towards the way in which settler-
colonialism structures its autopoietic field through a politics of recognition, I will argue 
that this unitary view can be destabilized via a politics of address. In doing so I will argue 
  
23 
that the poem should be understood as a decolonial gift inviting the reader into a 
relationship of thinking from/with the colonized and towards political liberation. 
 Finally, I will end with a short conclusion that will summarize the way in which 
poetics is able to link the philosophical anthropology of the decolonial subject, the 
metacritique of reason in the space of the border, and the ethics of political liberation. In 
doing so, I will show how the decolonial option leads to the concept of pluriversality as a 
global space of complex solidarities. 
  
24 
Aimé Césaire and the Black Caribbean: Philosophical 
Anthropology of the Decolonial Subject 
 In relation to Lewis Gordon’s work on the guiding questions of decolonial 
thought, I understand philosophical anthropology to be a consideration of the material 
and symbolic intersubjective nature of humanity, and the forms of subjectivity and 
relation that arise therefrom. As a way of examining the philosophical anthropology of 
the decolonial subject this chapter will explore the work and thought of the Martinican 
poet, politician, and decolonial thinker Aimé Césaire. It will focus on poems from his 
book Un Soliel Cou Coupé (1947) as well as his essays “Calling the Magician: A Few 
Words on Caribbean Civilization” (1944) and “Poetry and Knowledge” (1945) originally 
printed in the journal Tropiques, as well as Discours sur le Colonialism (1950). From 
these examples I will argue that Césaire opens up knowledge via poetics as a means of 
thinking from the Black Caribbean as a political-epistemic subject embodied in the 
experiences of slavery and colonialism yet moving toward the horizon of decoloniality. 
Drawing on Walter Mignolo’s concept of the geo- and body- politics of knowledge, I will 
show that in order to respond to the needs and desires of colonized and racialized 
communities in a way that articulates and cultivates agency, knowledge production must 
be understood as part of an autopoietic practice of knowing and doing grounded in the 
concrete relationality of bodies - both in their positionality within the modern/colonial 
world system and their communal desires for decolonization. An exploration of these 
tendencies will come via the themes of sterility and excess, death and rebirth, in Césaire’s 
poetry. The ways in which he connects these thematic tensions within the historical and 
political reality of the Caribbean, and the everyday experiences of the Black body - both 
as it is constructed as an object via colonial dominance and as the locus of autonomous 
agency - and the complex images by which he seeks to transform this reality, will act as a 
guide leading us through the concrete construction of the decolonial subject in relation to 
the hybrid being of humanity as both bios and logos. Knowledge is thus brought into a 
new relation to power, which is premised upon collective needs rather than the abstract 
production of the universal ‘zero-point’ manifested as Imperial Man. 
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 The poems that I will be examining are collected in the original printing of Soleil 
cou coupé from 1948, recently edited and translated by A. James Arnold and Clayton 
Eshleman (2011). The date of this collection is significant in several respects. First, it is 
printed just a year after Césaire had helped bring into existence the 1946 law that 
transformed Martinique into an overseas department of France, a move meant to achieve 
decolonization in the form of political equality within the institutional structure of the 
French Republic. It was at this time, argues Nick Nesbitt, that Césaire’s concerns, and 
their reflection in his poetry and essays, were “drawn between a reflexive celebration of 
blackness…and the ultra-leftism of a Surrealist politics, a politics limited…to the 
throwing of cultural ‘bombs,’ without any clear procedure for the development of a 
militant Negritude of universal….scope” (104). The means of this development would 
appear in the years after, and “as early as 1949…Césaire took the crucial step beyond 
departmentalization [when]…in a July 11 speech, he affirmed the existence of a 
Martinican national consciousness” (107). This was marked, Nesbitt argues, by a shift 
from “the cosmogonic Surrealism that had characterized his creative production during 
the immediate post-war years” to “an anticolonial socialist realism” of tropical specificity 
after the 1950’s (117). Key to this shift is the publication of his Discours sur colonialism 
in 1950. Importantly, Soleil cou coupé was subsequently heavily edited by Césaire, many 
poems being removed and others rearranged “to bring them in to line with the political 
aims of the blended collection Cadastre (1961)” as a part of this shift (Soleil xiii). 
 However, it would be incorrect to see this shift in focus as a decisive and 
irrevocable break for Césaire’s work and poetics. Rather, what I want to focus on is the 
articulation of Césaire’s two concerns: a self-reflexive examination of colonized and 
racialized experience in the Black Caribbean, and a universal politics of Third-world 
communism manifesting as anti-colonial liberation; that is, a practice of epistemology 
and politics, identity and liberation, yoked together by an embodied poetics. Césaire’s 
effort to articulate the subjective and the political, embodied and intellectual, via the 
medium of poetry forms a link between early essays such as “Poetry and Knowledge” 
(1945) and his later Discours sur colonialism. Key to this, as mentioned above, is his 
commitment, after the failure of departmentalization, towards an emerging Martinican 
national consciousness, decisive in his shift from a politics of inclusion in colonial 
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organizations of power to one of autonomy. I would like to argue that, although, as 
Nesbitt states, Soleil cou coupé marks the end of his early ‘cosmogonic Surrealism,’ it 
nonetheless attends to this shift towards and beyond national consciousness as a point of 
confrontation with coloniality and represents, thereby, a grounding moment of decolonial 
poetics in which the absence of racialized experience in the Western model of the human 
is confronted and translated into a point of excess from which springs a new horizon of 
meaning. Thus, the poems allow us to grasp the entanglement of the political and the 
epistemic in decoloniality, and the practice of humanity that this entanglement 
concretizes. 
 Many of Césaire’s poems gravitate on a thematic relation between images of 
putrefaction or sterility and an uncontrollable fecundity, resolving this tension in a 
dynamic form that points toward possibilities of fulfillment. For instance, “Redemption” 
begins as “the loud noise gravitates rotten with cargo / wormy and bright disaster” 
invoking the history of slave ships and the human misery that they encased (27). The 
poem continues in a parallel image: “the loud noise gravitates meninx of diamonds / your 
face glides into my milky frenzy”. Thus, the human cargo of the slave ship is, for those 
who own the ships, tied to the production of value via the labor which will be the 
enslaved body’s entrance into the modern/colonial world system as the basis of a colonial 
consumption that produces fulfillment for the metropole at the expense of the Black 
bodies in the colonies. However, the connection between their dehumanization and 
capitalist valuation, manifested in the parallel construction of the image of the cargo and 
meninx of diamonds, is destabilized by the naked confrontation between the poet and the 
face of the other. And indeed, the poem ends with an injunction to “swelter crude 
radiance / in the very slow nakedness of my hand / virgin umbilicus of the earth” which 
opposes the ‘crude radiance’ of a new relation with the earth to the previous construction 
of colonial fulfillment via the Black death of colonial consumption. Thus, for Césaire, the 
formal and symbolic structures of this poem, and others, revolve around the specific 
position of Black bodies, their violent entrance into modernity/coloniality, and the 
possibilities of alternative forms of human fulfillment. The opposition between sterility 
and fecundity then, is not so much one of abstract universal states, but of embodied 
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experiences that are tied to larger political-epistemic projects that order the world of the 
Black Caribbean. 
 The Caribbean island of Martinique was ‘discovered’ by Columbus in 1502 and 
colonized by the French in 1635, an event that marked the beginning of the extermination 
of the island’s Indigenous inhabitants. It also marked the entrance of the island into the 
Atlantic slave trade as the site of “the slave-based plantation system centred around sugar 
production” (Richardson 16). Its entrance into the modern/colonial world-system, which 
Césaire formalizes in his work, is thus built on the entwined moments of genocide and 
enslavement that rendered its land and people raw materials for the processes of colonial 
consumption by which the French metropole accumulated wealth and power, and by 
which a racial-class hierarchy on the island was formed. This status as colonial resource 
structured its relationship with Europe up to the time of Césaire’s writing and beyond, 
affecting the development of the island politically, economically, and culturally. Even 
abolition in 1848, which granted nominal freedom, and thus humanity, to the enslaved, 
was granted by France rather than seized. For Edouard Glissant this distinction is 
important as the proclamation of 31 March 1848 was a document that structured freedom 
as a state conferred on the colonized at the convenience of the colonizer, with little to no 
recognition of the injustice of slavery or of continuing neocolonial relations. The 
humanity of the enslaved was given as a response to the needs of the French, and the 
proclamation was but “the thinly veiled declaration of our alienation” that maintained the 
colonial relation of Black sterility and colonial fulfillment mentioned above (Glissant 27). 
Indeed, what began as colonization, followed by a thinly veiled dependency, became, 
with the island’s choosing to become an overseas department in 1946, what can be best 
described as a process of assimilation. 
 The ideology of assimilation is key to the French colonial myth by which it 
presented (and presents) itself as “responsive to aspirations of the colonial peoples for 
integration into the body politic of the ‘mother country’, making this integration an 
element of their colonial policy” (Richardson 1). By insisting on a cultural, rather than 
biological, based form of racism, in which local cultures were seen as lagging behind 
French modernity, “it was made clear to black people in the French colonies, in no 
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uncertain terms, that their only salvation lay in renouncing their own cultural traditions 
and embracing those of the white masters” (3). In spite of this ideology however, the 
post-slavery period continued to show “Martinique [as] dependent politically, 
economically, and even culturally on France” while the unending process of assimilation 
provides coherence and legitimation of French cultural superiority, which can be seen by 
turning briefly to the Black middle class (17).  
 As slavery came to an end and there were increasing opportunities for individual 
advancement, there formed a Black middle class who integrated themselves, however 
imperfectly, precariously, and warily, into the dominant worldview. As René Ménil 
observes, “in colonized lands, ideas for the natives to adopt that are suited to the effective 
exploitation of the conquered territory arrive along with the soldiers, administrators, tools 
and police” as “it is very useful for a European if the colonized person’s thought exactly 
harmonizes with colonialist views or, more exactly, serves them” (50). Thus, a 
“coincidence of feeling” emerges in which, lacking the burden of their own historical 
experience, the Caribbean subject comes to exist in “an unreal realm determined by 
another people’s abstract and ideal forms” (50-1). That is, they are taught to reflexively 
experience themselves according to the terms of coherence for Western Imperial Man, 
rejecting Blackness as inferior to or outside of this coherence. This results in an 
intellectual and creative denial of the body, reflected in the social and cultural sterility 
that Césaire diagnoses in his work, and what emerges from the alienated Caribbean writer 
is “a literature that lacks energy…without attachment to the flesh” (52). This leads, 
Césaire argues, to a state of “thingification”, in which the colonized and racialized body 
is reduced to a form of fallen matter, able to be overcome only insofar as the individual is 
able to perform an assimilative adherence to French cultural norms, which are in turn 
sustained by the massive exploitation of the Caribbean colonies turned Overseas 
Departments (Discourse 43). In other words, a philosophical anthropology is advanced in 
the colonial situation that maps onto the model advanced last chapter via the work of 
Mignolo and Wynter: one in which the human is idealized according to the 
overrepresentation of Imperial Man as a universal norm that marks all others as deficient, 
convoking them in a liminal relationship of colonial consumption via a denial of sociality 
where “there is no human contact, but relations of domination and submission” (42). It is 
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the reattachment of thought to the flesh that Césaire seeks via his poetics as an opening to 
a new decolonial subject. 
 This relation of the violence of colonization to knowledge can be seen in the 
poem “Solid” (49). In the poem, Césaire finds that “the plumb line of gravity having been 
installed at the facile bottom of solidity” there is a state of complete stasis, as “nothing up 
to and including the sun that has not stopped…The world is fixed. Stone is fixed.” 
Furthermore, this fixity carries with it an “immense false movement” that gives the 
appearance of truth. Against this, the poet raises a series of images of life and death, 
culminating in an injunction that “Face of man you shall not budge”. Yet, this is not a 
compromise with the forces of stagnation, but rather an ironic reversal, as the face of man 
is “caught in the ferocious coordinates of my wrinkles” and thus contained not in the 
supposedly eternal abstract truth of “the plumb line of gravity” and its “false movement” 
of progress, but rather in the embodied experience of the poet as he ages. Thus, the 
opposition between states of sterility and creative excess that Césaire uses to formally 
organize his poetics as a means of critique and revitalization, are here joined to the 
specific production of knowledge as a means of stabilizing the world. In such a system, 
the poet’s own aging body calls into question the fixity of the world as it is constructed 
by colonial consumption around the figure of Imperial Man as the organizing point of 
coherence. In insisting on an embodied confrontation with this system, Césaire rests his 
decolonization on thinking from the embodied existence of Blackness that focuses on the 
system of knowledge and colonial consumption as the problem, rather than seeing the 
communities of the Black Caribbean as ‘problem people’. 
 Recall in my discussion of Lewis Gordon’s concept of disciplinary decadence, 
how he described an immortal, unchanging discipline as a “monstrosity”. What does this 
mean exactly? It is connected to his understanding of such disciplines reducing thought to 
a form of applied work, functioning simply to control and classify the world according to 
the supposedly universal needs of the disciplinary subject. It becomes monstrous because 
of the relations that such forms of disciplinary thought can justify and create, such as 
Césaire’s concept of ‘thingification’. That is, when the discipline, in its application, 
creates a situation in which only certain experiences are rendered knowable and 
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communicable, only certain bodies made viable as points of coherence from which the 
world can be known and autonomously organized. This validation of only certain modes 
of knowing reflects what Miranda Fricker calls epistemic injustice, explored in her work 
Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing (2007). Fricker argues that epistemic 
injustice results when social groups possess asymmetrical access to power and are able to 
structure the material and epistemological resources of society for their own benefit 
(147). This means that one group has an “unfair advantage in structuring collective social 
understandings” (147). Fricker further notes that epistemic injustice can obtain in regards 
to both the content - not having the means of articulating an experience properly - and the 
form of what can be said - being unable to express their experience in a way considered 
meaningful (160).  This creates a relationship of “situated hermeneutical 
inequality…such that the subject is rendered unable to make communicatively intelligible 
something which it is particularly in his or her interest to be able to render intelligible” 
(162). Thus, certain communities are left out of the general production of knowledge, and 
thereby placed in positions in which they are at a disadvantage in terms of their ability to 
act on and transform their experience. This leads to a system of knowledge in which “the 
whole engine of collective social meaning [is] effectively geared to keeping these 
obscured experiences out of sight” so as to ensure the smooth functioning of knowledge 
production in relation to the unequal material structuring of society (53). 
 The result, returning to Gordon, “is the notion of ‘problem people,’ people who 
disrupt the system” (Disciplinary 40). These are people who have been in some way 
excluded from, yet remain within, the system. In a situation of disciplinary decadence and 
epistemic injustice, in which sociality is denied in the name of epistemic purity, they 
become not a problem with the system of knowledge, a problem produced by that system, 
but a problem to be solved by that system - through assimilation or liquidation. This 
‘solving’ is a form of political-epistemic control that produces knowledge in relation to a 
normative subject and social order premised on the denial of alternatives, obscuring the 
human social agency that constructs these peoples as problems in the first place. As 
Gordon argues, “the problem faced by the problem people is how to be actional. Such 
people live in a world in which the assertion of their humanity is structured as a 
contradiction of the system” (92). In order to find our way out of the epistemic injustice 
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of disciplinary decadence, to become ‘actional’, we will need a philosophical 
anthropology that is responsive to the social, to the body’s various entanglements, its 
histories as well as its agency. The focus, Gordon argues, should be on the questions 
animating the query via “a teleological suspension of disciplinarity” that “could initiate a 
new relationship to that discipline: one of a higher level of understanding” (44).  
 This teleological suspension of disciplinarity makes room for insurgent 
knowledges, which will allow us to see how poetics is necessary to think from rather than 
about the colonized, constructing them as subjects capable of their own self-reflecting 
rather than as problem peoples. This transformation, from thingification to autopoiesis, is 
the task that Césaire took for himself in his poetry and thought. The poem for Césaire 
functions as a political-epistemic creative act, an act of autopoiesis, that is based on a 
philosophical anthropology of decoloniality in order to express the being of the Black 
Caribbean. As Gordon argues, decoloniality “requires resisting the reduction of human 
subjects into problem subjects of a project of epistemic imposition…there is thus a 
paradox at the heart of human studies, and it is that the human being must be constituted 
by them while always transcending them” (126). Poetics is necessary to the creative 
epistemic-political work of this transcendence that is able to instantiate a human subject 
that pushes beyond the disciplinary bounds set by Imperial Man. Césaire’s poetry allows 
us to see that the hard work of thinking from the colonized is an autopoietic process 
within a political-epistemic project that constitutes new worlds as it comes to know itself 
otherwise.  
 However it should be noted that this aspect of the systematic production of 
‘problem peoples’ attains specific features in relation to Blackness. Thus, Césaire must 
not only work to think from the geographic space of the Caribbean, but from the 
biographical fact of Blackness as well. Racism is, according to Gordon, the “denial of the 
humanity of a group of human beings either on the basis of race or colour” which “makes 
such beings a form of presence that is an absence…below the category of Otherness” in a 
relation of epistemic injustice as “a carefully crafted discipline of unseeing” (61). This 
raises problems as the Black subject attempts to negate their racialization by attempting 
to live in good faith via a process of assimilation, which demands that they “be good 
  
32 
without being critical” as “critical consciousness challenges intrasystemic consistency by 
raising systemic critique” (Africana 33). Thus, if the Black subject is really human, they 
are told, they can transcend the colonial boundaries that have been imposed and find 
salvation within the relationship of colonial consumption, and so assume the position of 
Imperial Man. However, to do so would be to live a white construct, to be other than 
themselves and to still be regarded as out of place, a Black performing whiteness: “In 
each instance, the black attempts to address a problem and encounters himself as the 
problem” (33). This means that, while the system relies on the production of Blackness, 
materially and symbolically, in order to produce a coherent normative humanity, it is 
nonetheless haunted by the stubborn presence of the Black body. The Black subject is 
offered a model of assimilation to which their failure is all but inevitable, thereby 
sustaining the production of a normative humanity as an imperative that requires the 
subjection of colonized and racialized subjects. Thus, the turn to the lived experience of 
Blackness, to the ways in which Black subjects have been rendered exterior to the system 
and stripped of any interiority, is necessary in the explication of a decolonial 
anthropology. This means that, within the racial hierarchy of slavery and its after-lives 
“white-black relations are such that blacks struggle to achieve Otherness; it is a struggle 
for the ethical to emerge. Thus, the circumstance is peculiarly wrought with realization of 
the political” (Africana 35). The political-epistemic aspect of this struggle emerges when 
the recognition “that the black was born out of specific circumstances reminds us that the 
black has not always been here and, like other human formations, may not always be 
among us” (36). This requires an attentiveness to Blackness that relates knowing and 
doing to the body, both the violence visited on it as well as its creative resistance. That is, 
the specificity of the slave’s experience “pushes phenomenological experience toward an 
understanding of a situation structurally unavailable or quite literally impossible for 
members of a dominant class” and this understanding is the opening towards a new 
humanity that destabilizes the coherence offered by Imperial Man (Nesbitt 275).  
 It is important to understand that this process is happening at two levels, joined in 
what Césaire calls ‘civilization’ as the autopoietic ordering of societies. On the one hand, 
from the perspective of Martinique he claims that the “Caribbean has no civilization” 
(Calling 120). Understanding that civilization “is a wondrous generalized communion” 
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Césaire thus draws a connection between a sense of alienation and lack of agency that 
manifests itself in social and cultural sterility centred on the production of Blackness 
(121). Césaire argues against this absence that “the most vital thing is to re-establish a 
personal, fresh, compelling, magical contact with things” and to renew the Caribbean via 
an embodied agency that is grounded in local autonomy (120-121). On the other hand, he 
also diagnoses this alienation within the world context of European capitalism and 
colonialism, stating that “between colonization and civilization there is an infinite 
distance” and that from the products of this distance “there could not come a single 
human value” (Discourse 34). Further arguing that this distance is the result of “humanity 
reduced to a monologue” Césaire thus relates the political state of domination to the 
epistemic production of humanity as an abstract coherence - what I have been referring to 
as Imperial Man (74). Against this he proposes, “a humanism made to the measure of the 
world” (73). The epistemic understanding of the world in the symbolic realm is thus 
grounded in the construction of local autonomies on the material level. What holds them 
all together is poetics and its role in the formation of the decolonial subject, as “poetic 
knowledge is that in which man spatters the object with all of his mobilized riches” 
(Poetry and Knowledge 145). Importantly, this is a relationship that extends beyond the 
dominating organization of modernity/coloniality, as it is through knowing that Césaire 
models the construction of the world as a relationship that is produced and maintained. 
Poetry, in other words, is a “vertiginous expansion” of humanity in the affective, 
embodied level, and poetics as a process of this self-creation on the level of language is 
necessary in order to articulate a political-epistemic project that can realize this expansion 
of concrete humanity (140). As we shall see, this is why, for Césaire and his heirs, 
decolonization is a “new science” that creates a climate of “poetic violence…[in which] 
currencies lose their value, courts cease to make judgments, judges to sentence, juries to 
acquit” (140-1). Césaire thus offers a poetics of insurgency in which the autopoietic self-
organization of communities can disrupt the material-symbolic system of the 
modern/colonial world, in the process constructing the horizon of decoloniality as a 
political-epistemic project.  
 This grounding of knowledge production via poetics in Blackness can be seen in 
the poem “Lynch I” (7). In this poem, the violence of slavery and colonialism is 
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transformed and becomes the grounds for a new knowledge via Césaire’s direct address 
to his “lynch loveable companion…on your loom a continent exploding into islands”. 
Césaire turns the violence of the African entrance into the modern/colonial world from an 
absence that requires redemption to a ground from which to think, whose fulfillment in 
knowledge can open up a transformation of the world. And indeed, the images of 
lynching in the poem are multiple, exploding and work to extend beyond the bounds of 
Imperial reason in images of simultaneous destruction and creation: “lynch is a temple 
destroyed by roots and gripped by a virgin forest.” It is “an entry into matter” that 
materializes the modern/colonial world and the entrance of the Black subject into it. It is 
then by attending to this pain, this history and geography of violence across the spaces of 
the New World, that knowledge is given an embodied relation to the construction of the 
world, beyond the abstract universal. As this poem shows, read in conjunction with 
earlier poems, it is the infliction of violence on the racialized and colonized body that 
performs and thus actualizes the existence of the modern/colonial order. It is the power 
exerted over the Black body that allows the enunciation of peace, security, and social 
order, which structures the agency, and self-organization of Imperial Man. A radical 
subjectivity forms from within Blackness that displaces the logic of dehumanization 
instantiated by modernity/coloniality, and Césaire’s poetics structure an epistemological 
break as part of the larger political project of decoloniality. This larger project can be 
thought through the Black radical tradition as an autopoietic organization. 
 The Black radical tradition, as put forth by Cedric Robinson in his work Black 
Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (1983), focuses on the emergence 
of specifically Black forms of thinking and doing within the modern world, grounded in 
an African past but shaped by the conditions of the New World and the experiences of 
colonialism and slavery. Basing his analysis on Karl Marx’s concept of primitive 
accumulation, Robinson recognizes that the process of capitalist development in the 
modern world is tied to the appropriation of land, wealth and labour from other 
civilizations for the needs of Europe. Primitive accumulation in this sense is the process 
whereby different cultural formations are brought into contact via structural couplings 
that respond to the needs of Imperial Man. However, as Robinson notes, the use of 
African labour, their deposition in the New World, had “a consequence entirely 
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unintended and unanticipated by the tradesmen and ideologists of slavery” as “the cargos 
of the slave ships were real human beings” who carried with them “African cultures, 
critical mixes and admixtures of language and thought, of cosmology and metaphysics, of 
habits, beliefs and morality” as the terms of their humanity (173, emphasis in original). 
Thus, the African past was deposited in the New World, and the development of this past 
across the diaspora would be entangled with the development of modernity/coloniality, 
containing the seeds of decoloniality. In tracing the history of slave revolts, uprisings, and 
marronage across the New World, Robinson argues that the Black radical tradition, in 
resistance to slavery and colonialism, contained “a very different and shared order of 
things” (243, emphasis in original). Furthermore, he notes that this was not simply a 
material process, in which the slaves can be conceived of as desiring liberal forms of 
belonging - a conceptualization that would reaffirm the salvationist rhetoric of modernity 
- but was resolutely epistemological as well, such that those who resisted “lived on their 
terms, they died on their terms, they obtained their freedom on their terms” (245). Thus, 
the Black radical tradition is “the continuing development of a collective consciousness 
informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of 
obligation to preserve the collective being” (246).  
 Importantly, he argues that this coherency occurs outside of the racial ordering of 
the modern/colonial imaginary. Against a view that would see these insurrections and 
marronages as bounded local phenomena, geographic and historical acts that are internal 
to specific modern/colonial nation-states, he argues that while occurring within the 
cauldron of Western society, the Black radical tradition is “the makings of an essentially 
African response, strewn across the physical and temporal terrain of societies conceived 
in Western civilization” and thus that “Black radicalism is a negation of Western 
civilization, but not in the direct sense of a simple dialectical negation” (96, emphasis in 
the original). Following from this, we can see that Césaire’s arguments on the need for 
civilizational renewal from different memories than those of Imperial Man, from the 
incorporation of the embodied Black subject into the modern/colonial world system via 
slavery, opens the grounds for a radically other ordering of the world. 
  
36 
 For instance, the poem “Mississippi” conjoins the emerging struggle for 
Martinican self-determination via an outer-national identification to the history of civil-
rights organizing in the American South, and the violence that is the motivating force of 
such organizing.In the poem Césaire thus proclaims “Too bad for you men who don’t 
notice that my eyes remember / slings and black flags / that murder with each blink of my 
Mississippi lashes” (1-3). Here the poet’s body fuses with the historical violence visited 
on Black communities throughout the diaspora. Césaire repeats this invocation three 
more times in the short poem, before ending with a final image of unstoppable creation 
“under the calm ferocity of the immense geranium of our sun” (14). Thus, we see here 
several things. First, is that the play of pain across the body, meant to reduce the Black 
subject to a thing void of consciousness, the memory of which for Césaire grounds an 
unexpected (“too bad for you men who don’t notice”) vitality that is capable of 
transforming the world. Second, this is done through a play between geographical and 
historical place and the destabilizing fact of Blackness. Here we see it in the invocation of 
Caribbean nature and geography as a new horizon, but beyond that in the refrain of 
‘Mississippi’ as an outer-national identification with the American South’s history as a 
ground for creating common affective ties among the African diaspora. However, this is 
not an identification in some easy, comparative sense, but places that geo-historical 
location in a complex play of other signifiers, such that the immense ‘geranium’ of the 
Caribbean sun comes to articulate a continual process of creation that is civilizational in 
scope. Thus, the Mississippi eyes of the poet are continually rearticulated in a series of 
images that come to cohere not so much around a definable statement as a series of 
mutational relations between violence, the Black body, and the proliferation of histories 
that their interaction undergirds in the New World. Thus, it is only by linking his own 
subjectivity to the “Mississippi lashes”, that is, to the violent process by which Black 
subjects are formed and managed in the modern/colonial world, that Césaire is able to 
imagine, via the image of the Caribbean sun, a new subjectivity which shows the 
insufficiency of modernity/coloniality and the possibility of transformative action. 
 This reading, and my chapter, has largely focused on Césaire’s work in relation to 
the construction of Blackness within modernity/coloniality, rather than turning to images 
which could possibly index the standard dismissal of Négritude as an essentialized 
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fetishization of a pure African origin. Nick Nesbitt, arguing for Césaire’s poetics as a 
political praxis predicated largely on the French tradition from the Jacobins to the 
present, claims that “while he rightly celebrated the legacy and accomplishments of afro-
Atlantic cultures, these specificities never served to ground the ethical and political 
claims he made against global imperialism” (271). Indeed, as Nesbitt goes on to argue, 
Césaire’s work “will interpolate every reader, no matter their previous ‘identity, but will 
do so via their own singular specificity” (280). What is important here is not that the 
work of either Robinson or Nesbitt is necessarily more ‘true’ in terms of one’s 
interpretation of Césaire’s life and work, capable of providing a pure origin for his 
politics in an African homeland, colonial diaspora or French political tradition. Indeed, 
the point of this chapter is not to advance some truth but rather to draw from his work 
principles of decolonial poetics as autopoietic subjectivation. And, moreover, this split 
between the material life of the Black radical tradition which Césaire sought to give voice 
to on the one hand, and a European intellectual tradition on the other, speaks both to 
Césaire’s own middle class origins as well as his larger goal of civilizational 
transformation on the interlocking local and global scales. As he says in Discours “show 
me where I have talked of a return” (Discourse 45). 
 Thus, what we have in each case are different histories, different articulations of 
bodies and ways of knowing and doing within the structural coupling that brings the 
Caribbean into existence. And, Césaire sits at the point at which both of these traditions 
meet. From our examination of his poetics, it will be possible to understand the 
philosophical anthropology of the decolonial subject in relation to geo-history and 
community, that is, the geo- and body-politics of knowledge. Césaire’s poetry shows how 
thinking from the body is not just a simple act of identification or representation, but a 
complex articulation of sometimes conflicting traditions. It is poetry as a political-
epistemic intervention within the autonomous self-organization of society. 
 We have already established that, in regards to colonized and racialized subjects, 
from the coloniality of being comes controllable subjectivities positioned in service to the 
needs of the modern/colonial world system and Imperial Man. One of the tasks of 
decoloniality, as I have been discussing it, then, is to help in the formation of new 
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subjectivities. Drawing on Mignolo’s concepts of the geo- and body- politics of 
knowledge, we can draw out some lessons on what that looks like. The construction and 
maintenance of life in the modern/colonial world is such that the figure of Imperial Man 
emerges as the normative point of articulation in the production of knowledge, and that 
knowledge is universal and abstract, grounded in the hubris of the zero point. Descartes’ 
“I think therefore I am” thus acts to both conceal the systems of domination that structure 
the world of the Imperial subject, while also concealing the vulnerability of that subject 
by projecting their agency into a timeless space beyond the body: thought proceeds 
embodied agency. Against this, decolonial thinkers have attempted to think from the 
colonial difference, that is, from the bodies that exist in various states of domination in 
relation to their very constitution as knowable bodies and autonomous subjects. In doing 
so, Mignolo argues that what the disavowal of the racial imaginary of modernity revealed 
was a state in which the colonized think from their embodied communal lives, such that 
they are “no longer the other, and the irrationality of the other is located in the racial and 
patriarchal discourse on modernity” (Further Thoughts 41). Thus, following Gordon’s 
work on ‘problem people’ Mignolo attempts a shift towards thinking from the bodies and 
experiences of the colonized and racialized of the world, arguing that “different 
perspectives on modernity are not only a question of the eyes, then, but also of 
consciousness and of physical location and power differential” (Delinking 320). Thus, 
what emerges is a mode of knowledge production that is summarized as “I am where I 
think and do.” 
 This assertion works such that “the basic assumption is that the knower is always 
implicated, geo- and body- politically, in the known” (Darker 123). Thus “the first step in 
decolonial thinking is to accept the interconnections between geo-history and 
epistemology, and between biography and epistemology” as these locations and bodies 
have been constructed and ranked by the colonial matrix of power (91). This means that 
the local is always implicated in and by the global, and a focus on the geo- and body- 
politics of knowledge works such that, instead of narratives of national origins in service 
to the ordering of the modern/colonial world,  “what is left is a displacement from 
political identification at a national level, to identification with subject positions at a 
global capitalist-economy level” (Local 190). What does this mean for the philosophical 
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anthropology of the decolonial subject, and this subject’s negotiation of the structural 
coupling between, for Césaire, the Black and European radical traditions? 
 In their work, Maturana and Varela make a distinction between structure and 
organization in regards to the autopoietic development of autonomous unities. On the one 
hand, organization represents the overall relation of parts within a unity that define it. On 
the other, structure refers to the concrete arrangement of those parts in any given unity. 
Going back to the construction of humanity through the figure of Imperial Man then, we 
can see that the overall organization of humanity is obtained by valorizing certain 
biological features and cultural histories, certain ways of knowing and doing as structures 
which attain a normative value defining the human as such. This is contrasted to 
alternative structures, alternative ways of knowing and doing, which are seen as deficient. 
However, in my work on colonial consumption, we see that this process is itself the 
institution of the organization of modernity/coloniality, and that the two models of 
humanitas and anthropos are not autonomous unities, but the overall structure of 
humanity within coloniality in a way that robs humanity of agency while over 
representing those labeled humanitas as a normative measure. The relation to the geo- 
and body- politics of knowing and doing allows us to destabilize this relationship, by 
placing the human subject within its field of history in relation to geographic and 
biographic developments as the product of structural couplings. It does not posit a 
universal and essential essence, but rather sees the subject as embedded in specific 
histories of structural coupling that have selected certain possibilities, certain traditions 
and identifications, certain ways of knowing and doing, as normative in order to develop 
them within the overall frame of modernity/coloniality. Decoloniality then represents a 
means of selecting other traditions from which to organize local and global formations of 
the human. 
 This allows us to fill out Wynter’s concept of humanity as hybrid - bios and logos 
- as the grounds for the philosophical anthropology of the decolonial subject, one who is 
situated and yet from that situation can draw understandings of the world to configure 
forms of agency in their relationality. In the poem “Nocturnal Crossing” (21) Césaire thus 
speaks of “the animal alloy of muscle and voice”. Importantly, this poem moves 
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“between the arms of a scream” and the embodied relation of the subject to the violence 
of domination is concretized. Rather than salvation then, in asking to be put between the 
arms of the scream, Césaire is searching for a kind of fulfillment, a means of turning the 
absence of the racialized subject and the violence that maintains the system, into a point 
of (re)generation. Later, in the prose poem “Transmutation” (35) this connection between 
voice, materiality, and creation is concretized in the continual transmuting image of the 
poet’s hands through a series of forms that mark the connection between his agency and 
the world around him: “I have my diving-suit hands I also have my hands for rocking the 
little children…my pearl diver hands that are accustomed to the depths”. The poem ends 
with the image of the poet’s flaming hands “to serve as a scarecrow for the birds of the 
solstice” in an image of rebirth in which the creative agency of the poet, when placed in 
contact with nature, becomes the medium by which horizons of transformation open in 
the world. This conforms to a sense of the body that is beyond any normative sense of 
coherence offered in the figure of Imperial Man and the colonial consumption that 
sustains it as the organizing subject of modernity/coloniality. Thus, in his poetry Césaire 
offers a model of the human that is embedded in complex relations to the historical 
formation of societies, the social reality of the body, and the geographical space of the 
natural world. 
 Seeing Césaire as “a labourer of words” such that “the production of (poetic) 
objects becomes productive in turn of consciousness” Nesbitt aligns his analysis with 
Césaire’s invocation of ‘animal alloy’ and ties his poetics to the practice of humanity 
beyond modernity/coloniality (279). Césaire thus struggled against colonialism but 
“within poetry itself, as a struggle to make a poetics of revolution and a politics of 
culture” aimed at the material and symbolic organization of Martinican, Caribbean, and 
Black, reality (283). Arguing that “politics, like poetry, is an intervention into the 
symbolic realm, the profound torsion of the transcendental coordinates by which any 
world is indexed,” Nesbitt focuses on “the word as the constitutive, minimal unit or term 
that determines the visibility or invisibility of any being in a world” as the material-
symbolic point of insurgency that undergirds “Césaire’s undertaking as a vast poetics of 
post-imperial reason” (283-4). In other words, in this mode of subjectivation, “a 
traumatic core or structural lack of the symbolic order undergoes a torsion that opens 
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onto a new consistency” which is decoloniality (286). This subject is a constructed 
intervention into the material-symbolic ordering of the world, based in specific histories 
of embodiment, yet exploding towards new worlds. Thus, “the process of naming is 
central to this transformation of colonized consciousness…[and] gives form to the desire 
and drive for decolonization” (202). Articulating this desire across histories of African 
and European interaction, “the name is an objectification, the initial concretization of this 
struggle, which orients it and, in its simplification of a complex situation, serves to unify 
the diversity of demands, agendas, and positions of the individuals in revolt” (202). 
 In a later poem, “New Year” (87), Césaire makes this connection explicit as the 
poet begins “Out of their torments men carved a flower / that they perched on the high 
plateaus of their faces” and ends “that was the year when the seeds of humankind chose 
within man the tender approach of a new heart”. Poetry, for Césaire, is thus the means by 
which “unforgettable / metamorphoses” are possible, which can draw on the histories of 
violence as well as of ancestral knowledge, to forge new connections with Others and the 
world, and thus to advance a new practice of humanity. This is a poetics in which the 
subject is never easily separated from their history and community, their geo- and body- 
politics of knowing and doing, even as this relationship structures their agency and thus 
their ability to see and transform this context. Poetics in this manner becomes a way of 
the subjects forming themselves differently, of coming to know the world in terms of 
complex autopoietic practices that are creative and open ended. This is Césaire’s climate 
of poetic violence, in which the violence of the modern/colonial order is transformed, 
translated, into a new form of agency that subtracts from the established order so as to 
create new spaces of creativity and solidarity. This is what Césaire, in “Calling the 
Magician” refers to when he says that “the true poet does not preach work. He preaches 
availability” in relation to the world and others in it (122). Thus, poetics is needed to 
understand the decolonial subject based on an anthropology of the human as bios and 
logos, part of communal self-organization of autopoiesis beyond the coherence of 
Imperial Man, allowing not only a concern with the critique of violence and domination, 
but the cultural reproduction of the subject as well. That is why Césaire claims “the 
revolution will be social and poetic or will not be” (Calling 121). The creation of the 
decolonial subject is a process that occurs in a concrete relation to the geopolitical and 
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embodied situation of the colonized, and further, its poetics is such that the social 
structure is itself destabilized by its revolutionary force. What Césaire shows us is that 
decolonization isn’t a simple hailing of the already constituted subject, but a mode of 
subjectivation that structures new modes of being hybridly human, beyond the absolute 
terms of Imperial Man. 
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Weaving the Border: Cecilia Vicuña and Translational 
Agency 
 In this chapter I will turn to the work of Chilean poet and artist Cecilia Vicuña in 
order to understand the poem as a liminal space, that is, as the space of the border that 
forms the site of decolonial thought in the gaps and interstices of the modern/colonial 
world. Building from the philosophical anthropology of the decolonial subject, formed in 
a dynamic process of autopoietic self-organization of thinking from, I will here explore 
what exactly defines the ‘poetic climate’ as a border space that is necessarily contingent 
and social, a thinking with that engages the reader from within the colonial difference. 
Thus I will bring to the fore Gordon’s orienting question of the metacritique of reason, as 
the border is a liminal space that foregrounds the contingency of interpretation as a 
continual practice of translation beyond any totalizing narratives. Instead, manifesting a 
site that exists between different autopoietic fields and which engages in a translational 
practice, what Mignolo calls border thinking highlights the creative political-epistemic 
potential that emerges between immanence and theory, difference and proximity, as the 
grounds for a decolonial relationality beyond modernity/coloniality. 
 Born and raised in Santiago de Chile, Cecelia Vicuña “has been in exile since the 
early 1970’s, when the murder of elected president Salvador Allende by General 
Pinochet” brought the country of Chile under military dictatorship (Lippard 7). A 
supporter of Allende’s Popular Unity government and a fierce critic of the dictatorship, 
Vicuña has throughout her career made art, poetry, and drama that drew on the 
Indigenous heritage of the Andes in order to advance a liberatory vision of a world 
beyond the dictatorship and, as I will argue, modernity/coloniality. As Lucy Lippard 
states, this has been a practice “in the interstices” and between the borders of cultural 
traditions and their legitimating world views (8). In Vicuña’s work “the investigation of 
language and the politics of definition are always at stake” (de Zegher 24). How should 
this meeting between cultures be conceptualized? Answering this question will require 
fleshing out the process of colonial consumption in regards to the constitution of space, 
seen in the concept of nomos.   
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 Key to Mignolo’s theory of decoloniality is his engagement with the work of 
German political thinker Carl Schmitt on nomos. Nomos for Schmitt, and Mignolo, refers 
to the geopolitical extension of sovereignty, that is, to the sovereign creation of the space 
in which the law organizes forms of ordered life as well as its demarcation of the space of 
the outside as a space of chaos. It is, then, the space in which an autopoietic unity 
establishes a certain relationship of coherence and order. Yet, this will be important later, 
the outside, and its construction in relation to the inside, is itself bound to the legal and 
representational projections of the inside. It is, says Mignolo, the outside constructed in 
the process of making the inside (Delinking 316). Following from our previous 
discussion of primitive accumulation in relation to the Black radical tradition, we can see 
that this is a situation whereby two nodes of socio-historic experience are thereby 
coupled in one order of colonial consumption - given coherence by Imperial Man - 
necessitating a political-epistemic intervention. 
 There is another aspect of nomos that Mignolo draws out however. As he 
examines Schmitt’s theory he notes several things. First, that Schmitt’s theory performs a 
sleight of hand. Schmitt begins with the assertion of a multipolar world, divided by a 
series of nomoi that are locally but not globally interconnected in different ways and 
across different expanses (Anomie x). However, he then goes on to assert that the second 
nomos of the earth formed in the age of European expansion and hegemony, subsuming 
all others and transforming them into either its internal or external Others. The slight of 
hand, for Mignolo, is in asserting that this amounted to the superseding and destruction of 
the others, which he roundly rejects (xi). In this rejection, decolonial projects are 
grounded in the resurgence and regeneration of these other nomos, albeit changed by 
their new global frame and the new questions and problems that they must deal with. The 
aspect that is drawn out here is that of Schmitt’s own narrativizing of the emergence of 
the second nomos. That is, in addition to a legal and representational order, the second 
nomos, and all others, also are instantiated through the ways in which they are 
narrativized in connection to origins as a means of ordering the world for the existence 
and sustenance of certain forms of life. Thus, a nomos is what Sylvia Wynter would call 
an autopoietic field of material-symbolic organization in which a given society is 
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“enabled to fictively construct and performativley enact” itself in relation to the world 
(Ceremony Found 196). 
 This means several things. First, that the legal and representational systems of the 
nomos are part of a larger construction and justification of forms of life that ground 
themselves on an extra-human agency narrativized through recourse to history, progress 
or other forms of universal development in relation to a given origin. Second, it means 
that there is a two-way adjustment by each nomos as they come into contact with each 
other, disturbing their fields of relation that they had previously established. That is, on 
the one hand, all non-Western fields are yoked to the West’s, incorporated internally or 
externally in ways that subordinate them to Western law, representation, and 
narrativizing. They then become resources for the West’s continuing autopoietic 
becoming. On the other hand, these peoples themselves undergo changes as their 
autopoietic fields are disrupted while at the same time being opened up to new relations. 
It is bridging this disruption, incorporating the new relations into a resurgence of their 
autopoietic field in the creation of ways of life outside of the European colonial-capitalist 
nomos that decoloniality takes up. They seek, then, a new narrative, as was previously 
seen in the construction of the decolonial subject based on an understanding of humanity 
as bios and logos. This philosophical anthropology then contributes to an understanding 
of the space of decoloniality. Not a space of common identity, but a space of common 
conditions of existence, constructed through the affective connections of bodies and 
places. 
 Through the work of Santiago Castro-Gomez, I can go further and link this sense 
of cosmology, and the relation of one’s embodied experience to it, to what he calls 
‘literacy as state-of-grace.’ Similar to Mignolo’s rhetoric of modernity, literacy as state-
of-grace functions as an ideology which ties together the acceptance of a world order as a 
structuring authority, with the “hope that one day we may become its citizens” by 
accepting Western norms concerning the power of literacy as a “sign and vehicle of 
civilization” (237-8). This effects a relationship in which the local is overdetermined by 
the global, where local subjects work from their own communities towards an 
identification with this global order (240). Key to this work, however, is the 
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acknowledgement that this identification exists within a system of capitalist accumulation 
and colonial organization of identities. This is what Castro-Gomez, relating to Marx’s 
idea of primitive accumulation, explains as the space of antagonism: a space in which 
different forms of life are captured and translated by normative systems into value-forms 
in service to the accumulation of capital rather than the self-valorization of communities 
(239). What this requires then is a ‘suspension of the law’ that disrupts these processes of 
valorization in the name of social experiments with alternative orderings of value, seizing 
on the ambiguity offered by structural couplings that bring together distinct autopoietic 
fields (246).  
 The concept of antagonism, when placed in our framework of nomoi as 
autopoietic field, can thus allow us to differentiate between alternative modes of power. 
Against the state-mediated, colonial-capitalist power that organizes the modern/colonial 
world around the figure of Imperial Man in a process of colonial consumption, we can 
thus turn to Enrique Dussel’s conception of proximity and power grounded in 
community, as discussed by Alejandro Vallega. Against a model of political power that 
seek to impose order from a centralized sovereign, Dussel argues that “all political power 
arises from below” and that “the power of the community” thus precedes its centralized 
representation in the figure of Imperial Man (Vallega 67). This constructs political power 
in relation to the autopoietic self-instituting and self-organization of the community in 
service to its will to live according to concrete forms of knowing and doing. Concomitant 
with this new formulation comes the concept of proximity. Opposed to the distance 
between knower and known that undergirds the Cartesian subject and the possessive 
individuality of Imperial Man, proximity “recalls for us in concrete terms our most 
proximate human experiences” (69). That is, the decolonial subject is defined in its 
situated distinctiveness to others, such that our existence is maintained “out of a 
fundamental human proximity in distinctness…as we approach the other and as we 
sustain our relationships in the consciousness of the other’s distinctness” (69). It is this 
proximity which modernity/coloniality obscures as it translates the space of proximity 
into value-forms oriented toward colonial consumption. And it is this proximity that 
decoloniality seeks to sustain. 
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 This relationship of proximity, power, and nomos as autopoietic field can help to 
understand the role that culture, including art and literature, plays in the formation of 
modern/colonial spaces. Important to this discussion will be the work of Michael J. 
Shapiro and Néstor García Canclini. In his work Methods and Nations (2004), Shapiro 
examines the confluence of modern social sciences, culture, and the formation and 
legitimization of nation-states in the face of their colonial histories. Shapiro starts from 
the observation, which we have noted previously in relation to the concept of nomos as 
autopoietic fields, that “signifying practices do not simply disseminate information…they 
impose an order with respect to who can perform speech acts with significant collective 
consequences” (xvi). Shapiro thereby highlights that “it is necessary to treat the modern 
state not simply on the basis of its sovereign or external exclusions but also as a set of 
homogenizing practices” that discursively and materially produce a unified national space 
(19). Thus, what emerges in the formation of the nation-state is a cultural governance 
operating in “support of diverse genres of expression that can be staged to warrant the 
emerging sovereignty practices and the inhibition of those that do not” and which thereby 
pose a problem to the smooth integration of various populations into the hegemonic 
social organization (182). Importantly, governance in this case is not simply a process of 
unification and legitimization, but “a historical process in which boundaries are imposed, 
and peoples are accorded varying degrees of cultural coherence and political eligibility - 
not on the basis of natural divisions, but as a result of the exercise of power” (xvii). 
Finally, the nation-state, as it legitimizes certain forms of discourse and practice, works to 
order the social bodies over which it claims sovereignty, and “nationalizing states 
translate biological bodies into social bodies” (41). Thus, Mignolo argues that 
“coloniality of power is embedded in the state and as such it reproduces the colonial 
difference and represses the possibilities of thinking from it “in a relationship in which 
the local, considered as a closed, homogeneous territory, is overdetermined by the global 
as it is incorporated into the modern/colonial world-system (Local 263). Cultural 
governance is especially important to the consideration of decolonial poetics, as “one of 
the strong weapons in building homogenous imagined communities was the belief in a 
national language, which was tied up with national literature and contributed, in the 
domain of language, to the national culture” (Shapiro 218). 
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 By turning to John Beverley’s Against Literature we can gain more insight in the 
role of culture in legitimizing modern/colonial nation-states and forms of power. In the 
first place, Beverley is clear that by literature he means “the historically specific form it 
assumes between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries with the formation of the 
European vernacular languages, the modern nation-state, colonialism, capitalism and 
bourgeois culture, moveable type technology, the commodification of books and printing, 
and the modern university and education system” (viii). Literature, after all, came to the 
Americas with Columbus and “this fact has endowed Latin American literature with an 
ambiguous cultural role and legacy” (2). This institutes, as we have seen in relation to 
literacy as state-of-grace, a certain relationship to power such that “difference could be 
tolerated - even encouraged - but only within the centralized power system represented 
by the state and national language, which existed, like the literary text itself, both to make 
difference possible and to contain it” (25-6). This set up literature in a process of 
overvalorization, as a key value for the formation of modern and nationalist identities and 
ideologies where “the poem sets up a sphere of private experience and private self that is 
distinct from but not in contradiction with the public sphere and the public identity of the 
subject as a social agent” (38). This was in contradistinction to previous forms of 
organizing difference and knowledge in relation to power that existed pre-contact as part 
of Indigneous autopoietic fields. One such form was the quipu which, “consisting of 
woollen cords with knots…is an Inca instrument that registers events, circumstances, and 
numerals…these registering artifacts continued to be used during the first period of the 
conquista, to be replaced later by written systems” (34). Vicuña has engaged directly with 
the quipu throughout her career, often using it to ground a larger engagement with the 
relationship between Andean and European forms of life.  
 QUIPOem (1997), for example, is a book which alternates short lyrics with 
photographic representations of Vicuña’s precarios: “a series of small sculptures and 
installations constructed of found objects, or ‘rubbish’, made in landscapes, streets, or 
studio” (Lippard 8). In her words, the precarios sprung from a desiring force, a “form of 
communicating with the sun and the sea that gave me a lot of pleasure and a lot of 
strength” (qtd. in Lippard 8). Drawn together from scraps and detritus, bound by thread in 
loose, flexible patterns, the precarios, and their relation to the poems in QUIPOem bring 
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to the fore “the action of weaving itself [that] is the esthetic and spiritual thread” running 
through her work and thought as an engagement with Andean traditions (10). Ultimately, 
it is the art of weaving as a means of making connections that I want to look at in her 
work, and the way this fluidity, actualized at the intersection of Western and Andean 
forms of thinking and doing, can open up the space of the border.  Indeed, even her use of 
language is likened to weaving, in the way in which she recovers discarded memories and 
histories, investing them with new life, dissecting words “so that their internal metaphors 
were exposed, so people would see words not just as abstractions but as something very 
concrete” (Vicuña qtd. in Lippard 13). 
 This contrast between the materiality of the quipu and that of the written letter, 
which gradually replaced it as a mode of cultural governance, speaks directly to the 
concept of literacy as state-of-grace and the construction of civilization in relation to 
European autopoietic practices. On the most basic level the letter was the graphic, 
material means by which the colonies were administered and the cultures of the 
Indigenous inhabitants absorbed into the colonial system. However, in addition to this 
practical component, the system of alphabetic writing used by the colonizers was the 
basis upon which the colonial difference was erected, and was translated from a 
difference in material systems of recording memory to a chronological and progressive 
difference in the levels of civilization. Thus, Mignolo quotes an early colonial report that 
characterizes the indigenous inhabitants of ‘the New World’ as “people without writing, 
without letters, without written characters, and without any kind of enlightenment” 
(Renaissance 45). This association of the perceived lack in Indigenous cultures due to the 
absence of the written word was thus the basis from which an evolutionary model of 
writing was established, which saw the written, alphabetic character as the point from 
which all other systems were to be judged. Furthermore, through this evolutionary model 
the written, alphabetic system of writing used by the European colonialists became 
associated with an ideal of civilization and refinement, such that an implicit connection 
was made in which “linguistic behaviour and good manners are [taken for] signs of the 
civilizing process” (34). The letter as it was related to this civilizing process was thus a 
central means for the denial of coevalness practiced by the colonial powers, which is to 
say, that they incorporated the language and non-alphabetic writing practices of the 
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Indigenous peoples in a contrasting chronological, rather than spatial, relationship that 
supported colonialism and Indigenous dispossession. 
 Colonial consumption thus rests on a one-way relationship of translation as 
Indigenous reality was incorporated into a Western understanding of the world. This 
process can be read through Dipesh Chakrabarty’s idea of colonial translation. Colonial 
translation is the process whereby colonial systems absorb non-European ones into the 
system of universal reason. It does this by positing universal reason as a higher level 
process which contains the particularities of each culture within universal applicability 
(75). Furthermore, this obscures the lives, values, and knowledges of colonized peoples, 
as well as the ideological, political and historical bases that structure this relationship. 
Thus, contingent cultural differences are transformed into universal values, and the 
structural coupling that obtains between distinct autopoietic fields is one of colonial 
consumption that, on the epistemic level, is translational in nature, serving to facilitate the 
creation of value-forms for colonial-capitalist accumulation.  
 The work of Stuart Hall in his essay “Encoding/Decoding”, while focused in the 
field of media studies, can help to situate the place of the poetic object within colonial 
consumption understood as a translational zone. Hall argues that he wants to “think of 
this process in terms of a structure produced and sustained through the articulation of 
linked but distinctive moments - productions, circulation, distribution/consumption, 
reproduction” (123). This model thinks of communication as a ‘complex structure of 
dominance’ “sustained through the articulation of connected practices, each of which, 
however, retains its distinctiveness and has its own specific modality, its own forms and 
conditions of existence” (123). The object of these practices, he says, are meanings, 
which undergo a series of transformations as they pass through each stage of the process 
from the world to the work to its consumption by the audience. The work itself is thus the 
discursive form in which circulation takes place, but requires operations of translation in 
order to establish a relationship between reader and writer. These translational operations 
are social practices which structure production and consumption on the material and 
symbolic levels (123).Thus, “no one moment can fully guarantee the next moment with 
which it is articulated. Since each has its specific modality and conditions of existence, 
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each can constitute its own break or interruption of the ‘passage of forms’ on whose 
continuity the flow of effective production (that is, ‘reproduction’) depends” (123). The 
moments of production and reception “are not, therefore, identical, but they are related: 
they are differential moments within the totality formed by the social relations of the 
communicative process as a whole” and thus joined by the poem itself which mediates 
and organizes the institutional-societal relations (124-5). Importantly “the codes of 
encoding and decoding may not be perfectly symmetrical” and may thus form parts of 
different autopoietic fields (125). Colonial consumption thus occurs when the autopoietic 
field being harnessed for production - either as subject matter or material form - is 
completely subsumed to the autopoietic field of the receiver in a structural coupling 
whereby the receiver reproduces meaning from the structural positionality of Imperial 
Man within modernity/coloniality at a distance that sustains the global order against 
autonomous proximity.  
 However, it should be noted that Hall’s model, based on the production of mass 
media, has several limitations when we attempt to use it to understand the relationship of 
decoloniality. Hall’s work assumes, if not an absolute identification, then at least a 
relationship of normativity, figured via Imperial Man, that organizes the relationship 
between sender and receiver. Thus, while the producer may want to question dominant 
interpretations, in the case of decolonial poetics they want, more than questioning, to 
suspend dominant, normalized worldviews entirely. And while the reader may already be 
sympathetic to decolonial concerns, the goal of the poet is nonetheless to convoke that 
reader into a relationship of subjectivation and insurgency. Thus, by placing Hall’s work 
in a model of colonial consumption, we can see that the goal of decolonial poetics is the 
disruption of this consumption, engaging the reader in a relationship beyond the 
organizing coherence of modernity/coloniality. 
 The work that I will now turn to, and examine throughout the remainder of this 
chapter, is a performance given by Vicuña at The Poetry Project at St. Mark’s Church on 
May 6, 1995 and later collected in the collection Spit Temple (2012) edited by Rosa 
Alcalá and published by Ugly Duckling Presse. I will be working from both the recorded 
version of the performance as well as the transcription available in the published book. 
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While I will speak more to what this kind of generic instability means for the 
conceptualization of the border as a political-epistemic space of translation, for now I will 
simply point to the ways in which this instability is built into the performance itself. That 
is, the performance numbers among what Vicuña call her quasars “because they were 
quasi per, quasi form…they were nothingness itself in formation” (Spit Temple 124). 
This sense of a formal emergence is something that defines the philosophical 
anthropology of decoloniality as a constant reformulation of materials in a definite time 
and space, working to shape received knowledges into new formations beyond the 
structures and strictures of modernity/coloniality. The performance itself is one that 
engages with its environment, with Vicuña directly addressing the crowd, turning at 
points to acknowledge the sound of the surrounding city, and working in readings of 
older poems from her career as well as new works, always in the form of a variation that 
questions any idea of an essentialized original.  
 The relationships between language, sound, meaning and the construction of the 
world are key themes of this quasar. As I have already examined, the theme of weaving 
together scraps of language is omnipresent formally and thematically throughout 
Vicuña’s work. Now I would like to turn to three moments where she specifically draws 
these themes together. The first is in the opening. Vicuña states that “the word is time / 
and sound / breathing” (125-6). This thus ties together the body, the social interaction of 
communication, and the passage of time in relation to memory as the world is articulated 
from the confluence of all these factors. Further, she goes on to state that “sound / is 
enchanting / light” (126). Thus, it is not that the relationship of the word, the body, and 
the community gives rise to an objective description of the world, but rather that 
language is a form of enchantment, creating from the surroundings a world in the sense of 
a shared space and time of belonging, an autopoietic field. In other words, it is the logos 
that supplements and enlivens the bios in Wynter’s conception of the philosophical 
anthropology of the decolonial subject, here placed in relationship to its space of 
elaboration. Second, Vicuña turns to a story of the origin of sound told in South America. 
In this story, there are two groups of people, those who write and those who sing. She 
notes that in this myth, the people of the Rainforest say that when they were created, the 
gods gave them memory so that they could remember their stories, and thus sustain in 
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their daily communal actions the enchanting of the world that forms their autopoietic 
field. Conversely, there were some, representing anthropologists, who had no memory 
and were created with a little notebook in their hands. This represents the knowing of 
Imperial Man, the abstract view from nowhere in which the world is reduced to its 
translation and transcription from a distance. That this transcription is one that is colonial 
is shown by the third moment I wish to discuss. This is a second story about the origin of 
sound that Vicuña tells, in which she speaks of how, when people come to Lima from the 
mountains, they hear the noises of the cars and that this noise is the sound of a being that 
is feeding on the blood and body of the Indians. Thus, sound as a means of transcription 
by anthropologists is linked to the modern/colonial world of industrialization which seeks 
to open up Indigenous lands for resource extraction and settlement. Importantly, during 
the telling of this later story, she pauses to listen to those same sounds in New York, 
drawing a transnational connection that notes the omnipresence of modernity/coloniality 
as well as its distance from autonomous autopoietic forms of life sustained by proximity. 
What I want to argue, then, is that in disrupting the process of colonial consumption that 
orders relationships across the abstract space of knowledge production, a decolonial 
poetics produces a border space via a structural coupling that seeks to build a new space 
of encounter.  
 This constitutive problem can be thought through the work of Wolfgang Iser on 
the process of interpretation. In his work, Iser examines the specific modalities of several 
types of interpretation, from the hermeneutic circle to recursive loops. While the process 
of the interpretation of poetic works is most obviously grounded in the work of 
hermeneutic circles, all of his models can bear some relation to various processes by 
which coloniality or decoloniality can operate in the construction of material-symbolic 
objects. Thus, my concern will be with the overall assertion of his arguments. To begin 
with, like Mignolo, Iser apprehends the way in which interpretation can be restricted by 
hegemonic values or cosmogonies, such that “monopolies of interpretation thus present 
themselves as transcendental grandstand views, and although they see themselves as 
frameworks for the reality to be grasped, they actually seek to shape that reality 
according to their presuppositions” (2). Against the valorization of either the monopoly 
of interpretation by certain views, or the ethical and political assertions for subaltern 
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corrective views, he points to the constitutive translational basis of both forms of 
interpretation: “Each interpretation transposes something into something else. We should 
therefore shift our focus away from underlying presuppositions to the space that is 
opened up when something is translated into a different register” (5). This places a focus 
on the liminal space that is produced in all attempts at interpretation, such that 
“interpretation is primarily a performative act rather than an explanatory one” and 
constitutes a process of autopoietic organization (7).  
 Of course, there is always a  “residual untranslatability” that “transforms itself 
into the power that drives” the construction of meaning as an autopoietic process (147). 
This is made explicit by Iser, who argues that “the force that gathers in the liminal space 
has a poetic quality, as it brings something about that hitherto did not exist” (150). In a 
relationship of colonial consumption, coloniality “converts interpretation into an act that 
determines the intended meaning of the subject matter. When this happens, interpretation 
ceases. The colonization of the liminal space therefore sacrifices translatability and with 
it the chance to embrace more than was possible before the superimposition” in favour of 
reproducing the stability of Imperial Man and access to the autopoietic field of the 
colonized (151). It is “through this structural coupling, [that] the register - by opening 
access - is bound to make inroads into the very subject matter, as it is purpose-governed 
and hence through its very intervention occasions disturbances” (151). Functioning as a 
charting of reality, interpretation thus works to construct the worlds in which we live 
(154). Against colonial consumption, whereby interpretation is subordinated to 
maintaining the order of modernity/coloniality, there is thus the option to dwell within the 
translational liminal space of interpretation. This is the space of the border, and it is 
where Hall’s moment of circulation, the poem, is destabilized from a fixed object to a 
mediation of the autopoietic fields that structure production and reception.  
 Thinking from the border between the modern/colonial world system constitutes 
the displacement of hegemonic universal reason “from the perspective of the subaltern” 
and a “striving to bring to the foreground the force and creativity of knowledges 
subalternized during the long process of colonization” (Local 12). It is important to note 
however, that this is not a simple rejection of universal reason and the implementation of 
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a different hegemonic cultural tradition, but a thinking in two traditions from the 
perspective of the interaction of Indigenous and European social practices (67). Thus, it 
takes neither universal reason, nor the local traditions of knowledge as given, but as a 
history to be thought through and from, an articulation arising from the lived experience 
of the colonial difference and the different traditions that are appropriated in the life of 
the subject. The border is thus the space in which the decolonial subject is formed, and 
the space in which the metacritique of reason can be operationalized from the 
philosophical anthropology of decoloniality. Border thinking in relation to the decolonial 
subject lets us see that the ambiguity of antagonism is threatening because it contains 
other orders of living, ways of thinking and doing, that are never fully subsumed in the 
processes of colonial consumption. Thus, it allows the engagement of the constitutive 
logic of modernity/coloniality from different sites, and the border is the site of interaction 
that the geo- and body- politics of knowledge opens up in the process of consumption. 
Border thinking thus changes the way in which difference is conceived, and represents a 
means of thinking past dichotomies and into relationality. Border thinking thus represents 
a way of articulating a collective understanding that arises from shared histories and 
situations in a specific location and relationship of proximity.  
 Indeed, the formal structure of the quasar itself is that of a border space actualized 
by acts of translation. This can be seen throughout as Vicuña switches from language to 
language as she moves through different parts of the performance, switching between 
English and Spanish. Additionally, the Spanish itself is entangled with Quechua loan 
words or translations. For example the performance begins with a Spanish verse sung by 
Vicuña opening “Basura sa liva” and ending “qori wantu” (125). The first line translates 
as ‘garbage spit’ while the last as ‘gold berth’, itself a Quechua phrase. The Quechua 
phrase is suggested by the similarity between the English word ‘litter’ and the Spanish 
translation of the Quechua phrase ‘litera de oro’ (125). This yoking together of meaning 
across various languages is thus itself a performance of the relationship between the 
discarded (garbage spit) and its revaluation (golden) when placed in new formal 
relationships (berth). This sense of destabilization via translation is taken up throughout 
the quasar. For instance, later, in turning to one of her older poems, she reads it as 
translated into “proper English” by Suzanne Jill Levine for publication in the American 
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Poetry Review Vol.24 No. 3 (134). Coming right after the performance of a verse entirely 
in Spanish, and untranslated in the performance, this idea of ‘proper English’, and the 
relationship between language and the ordered coherence of the world it describes, is thus 
given an ironic twist. And later, when reading a poem from her translated book 
Unravelling the Words & the Weaving of Water she reads the Spanish version followed 
by the translated English. This continual clash of languages, and the worlds that they 
encode, is thus such that any stability, any sense of a ‘proper’ organization of the world 
beyond the momentary performance of the poet in proximity to the audience is 
destabilized into the space of the border. Thus, the border is a space woven in the attempt 
to create forms of living in the world between the proper languages and the 
modern/colonial world that underwrites this propriety. Indeed, in her final verse she 
speaks of poetry as a weaving of concepts, of language and reality such that two threads 
“one spun to the right / the other one to the left / so that they are in tension like 
lovemaking / to one another / this is what makes / the weaving / sacred” (137). This is 
given a cosmogonic scope as she says that “the world is a loose stitch” and “an account / 
of the people / tying it all…the stars / the river weaves / the woven / woven into one” 
(139). This constitutes the border as an autopoietic field that forms in the structural 
coupling of prior fields, and is a relationship of immanence that is able to disrupt the 
norms that organize this coupling as one of colonial consumption. In doing so, Vicuña’s 
poetics offer a new enchantment of the world. 
 This is because art, as one of its functions, is a practice that exists in tension with 
other consumption norms, able to disrupt and question them with alternative viewpoints, 
especially as art spreads beyond a defined field. As Nestor Garcia Canclini notes, art in 
the 21st century has moved beyond where any simple characterization of it as 
autonomous can be meaningful. Rather, we find that “the tremendous spread of video, 
computer animation, video games, and the multimedia uses of mobile phones has 
shattered earlier limits on the visual arts” (16). Furthermore, the proliferation of art fairs, 
museums, and auctions within a globalized art market, coupled with the spread of artistic 
practices outside of this market in the form of political demonstrations or advertising 
means that “we must pay attention to the multiple allegiances and mobile locations of 
actors who exhibit their art” and that these locations can no longer be theorized as 
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existing in an autonomous state, separated from the other logics and contexts in which 
they occur and with which they interact (20). Against an art springing from “the abstract 
concept of humanity as conceived in the Enlightenment” Canclini advocates “conceptual 
instability, variable meanings, in the ways artifacts are used” (56). This means taking into 
account both the global reach of art, as well as its local entanglements, colonial 
consumption and cultural legitimization as well as resistance and (re-)enchantment. 
 From this global system Canclini draws an aesthetics of imminence. In the post-
autonomous world, art is a matter of not only recognizing it through the aesthetic regime, 
but of appropriating objects for different means. “Appropriations are movements of 
power” he claims, that can place objects in many different contexts, moving them across 
and through the colonial difference (66). The basis of this is an acknowledgment of art’s 
contingency, its openness to the polysemy of metaphor which in turn opens up objects to 
multiple interpretations, multiple appropriations against the rigidity of a unified space 
that sorts them into their place. Thus, the localization of an artist in different autopoietic 
fields allows him or her to create from different cosmologies and histories. Imminence 
for Canclini is a state of “being on the outside and on the inside”, a part of the aesthetic 
regime and yet moving it in new directions (180). This imminence is an opening of 
subjectivity to the new and is “linked to practices that don’t take place in a vacuum, 
operating instead in the midst of unequal conditions under limitations that artists share 
with nonartists” (185). Art is ultimately “a way of getting things to remain unsolved” 
opening up a space for the formation of new subjectivities and new autopoietic practices 
formed by the competing logics structuring the globalized world (28). 
 Thus, the border is a meeting place between two autopoietic fields where they 
immanently contain the possibility of an-other order that doesn’t sacrifice either the 
Indigenous body nor the transnational connection and intercultural contacts that Vicuña 
weaves together in her work. This can be seen in the story Vicuña tells of Lola Kiepja, a 
Selk’nam woman who was the last of her people living in the traditional style after their 
land, Tierra del Fuego, was taken through violence by the Chilean state in the mid 20th 
century. Importantly, this process was one of genocide. However, Vicuña tells of how 
Lola was enamoured with the tape recorder brought to her by anthropologists, 
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recognizing its use for saving some of the history of her people via its communication. 
And Vicuña sings an incantatory song about Lola, recovering her body from the violence 
of colonial consumption in order to weave it into her re-enchantment of the world. In 
doing so, the body of the Indigenous woman, her experiences, are given space in 
Vicuña’s performance to enter into new relationships in the border, becoming 
immanently proximate to the audience. The border is then a space of dangerous 
crossings, it “is the social space of subaltern encounters, the Janus-faced border line in 
which peoples geopolitically forced to separate themselves now negotiate with one 
another and manufacture new relations, hybrid cultures, and multiple-voiced aesthetics” 
(Saldivar 13-4). 
 As a contact zone between two autopoietic fields, often in an asymmetrical power 
relation, the border is thus a space in which the process of translation is never 
unidirectional. Rather, double translation becomes the formative relationship, 
conceptualizing a mode of translation that is established in, and sustains, proximity. 
Double translation “emerges from the exteriority… of the modern/colonial world, from 
bodies squeezed between imperial languages and those languages and categories of 
thought negated by and expelled from the house of imperial knowledge” and works by 
dynamically engaging them in an process of autopoiesis that critiques the universal 
abstract order of reason as well as essentialized vaporizations of the local (Darker 20). In 
an essay called “Toward a Sensationalistic Theory of Translation” poet Johannes 
Göransson takes up recent work in translation theory that seeks to acknowledge cultural 
difference and the impossibility of a translation ever fully communicating its context. 
Göransson argues that such a conception relies upon a critical distance that supposes that 
the foreign and local contexts, and the ideal reader standing on either side of the act of 
translating, are hermetically sealed and stable, except for the troubling moment of 
translations itself. This is the model of translation mentioned earlier in relation to 
Chakrabarty, and the basis of colonial consumption. Göransson advocates that “we forget 
about context as a field of mastery, as a way of accessing the ‘true meaning’ of the poem, 
as an ‘over there’” and to take up the poem as a zone that “contains boundaries but it also 
traverses boundaries” in which contexts and meaning are constantly engaged in acts of 
translation that exceed any sense of a stable, masterly reader (Göransson). This places 
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poetics in an active relationship to memory as a means of disrupting its formalization via 
cultural governance in service to the autopoietic field of modernity/coloniality. 
 In her work The Insubordination of Signs, Nelly Richard examines the place of art 
under the Pinochet regime. Specifically, what I wish to focus on is her work on memory, 
and the ways in which she examines works of art that sought a rearticulation of memory 
not just in a oppositional reversal of the dictatorship, but beyond its very material-
symbolic structuring of representation, its very coherence as a universe of meaning. 
Richard argues that such attempts were motivated by three issues which “have caused 
memory, compulsively, to provoke ruptures, links, and discontinuities” (1). They are the 
threat of loss, the task of recuperation, and the challenge of pacification. Time for these 
works of art “is not a time irreversibly seized and frozen in recollection…condemning 
memory to follow the dictum of obediently reestablishing its own continuity” but rather 
an engagement with the past as “a field of citations, crisscrossed as much by 
continuity…as by discontinuity” (2). The result is works that play out in the context of 
political contingency, which “committed dispossession to memory using an alphabet of 
survival…in the shadow of a history full of violent forced entries and oppositional 
struggle” (2). This space of the border, as I conceptualize it, can be thought of as a space 
for what is “dysfunctional for the political-discursive economy” of modernity/coloniality 
via conceptual and semantic rupture, disrupting processes of colonial consumption (5). In 
the space of the border, then, the word becomes “a zone of tensions and schisms…a field 
of plural and divergent forces” (6). This is all against the cultural governance in which 
the past is “a depository of the values of national and popular identity to be rescued and 
protected for the sake of communal integration” in the order cohering mode of Imperial 
Man (11).  
 Especially pertinent for my concerns is Richard’s conceptualization of memory in 
terms of the figure of the book as a linear conceptualization of history. Against a linear 
historicity, she argues that “the arrangement of these meanings may find itself altered and 
de-composed, as the account and its narration set in motion novel forms of recombining 
time and sequences, of alternating pauses and flashbacks, of anticipating endings and 
skipping over beginnings, through a reading that resists being so predictably subordinated 
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to the chronology of linear time” (18). In the release of the past at moments of temporal 
disjunction “the present then becomes a disjunctive knot, capable of making recollection 
not a return to the past…but rather a coming and going along the winding turns of a 
memory that does not stop at fixed points, passing instead along a critical multi-
directionality of…alternatives” (18). In the context of an alphabet of survival, this is a 
relation in which poetics is able to give life to memory as a form of survival beyond the 
dominating hierarchies and violence of modernity/coloniality. It is thus a recognition of 
“culture’s capacity to transform and rearticulate social determinants” as  
“the structural relationship between aesthetics and society is based not on the 
linear correspondence of form and content, but rather on responses set loose by 
the multiple fractures of signs involved in symbolic creation, which unsettle every 
order based on linear transfers between text and context…What artistic-cultural 
practices do is actively dismantle and reformulate tensions and antagonisms via 
figurative languages that intervene in social discursivity, redistributing its signs, 
and changing them into new, multiple, fluctuating constellations” (67).    
 In making space for these constellations Vicuña transforms them from mere 
representation to enactment, as she reads from pages throughout the recital, taking up the 
role of the quipu reader who interprets for the audience. This resistance to the finality and 
stability of the written word can also be seen when she begins tearing out the pages of 
one of the books she is reciting from. Furthermore, she uses an openness to 
improvisation, seen when she stops to listen to the traffic of the surrounding city. Of 
course, in the written transcription some of these features need to be noted by footnotes, 
but the recitation of written words, the improvisation, and the transcription work to open 
up a space in which immanence is made meaningful, representing the gaps between 
discourses that must be negotiated. This includes, as we have seen, not only the 
performance itself, its recording and transcription, but the previous printed work of 
Vicuña, the oral communication of stories and myths picked up by the poet in her travels, 
and interlocutors such as Lola and the anthropologist who interviewed her, Anne 
Chapman. What is at issue here is not simply the physical reality of different mediums 
and sites, but rather a series of different classificatory genres that arrange these sites. And 
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Vicuña does not so much dissolve them in a totalizing gesture of absolute revolution, as 
link them through the translational space of the border in order to open up these genres to 
a reorganization along other lines as an autopoietic practice. 
 In line with the larger genealogy of decolonial struggle I have been charting, 
between sites as disparate and yet globally linked as the Caribbean, the Andes and Turtle 
Island, Richard argues that such works, which reconstitute memory outside of the 
structures of official coherence, are “inspired by a certain kinship that secretly aligned 
them, without premeditated agendas or methods” (3). This is how the space of the border, 
as a conceptual engagement, is able to actualize in different locations, bringing together 
different genres of humanity in new embodied interactions. It is a form of making 
knowledge from proximity, as opposed to what Fanon called a form of knowledge in 
which “men who no longer recognize each other, meet less and less and talk to each other 
less and less” (238). Instead, Vicuña brings forth “the heterogeneity of bodies and voices 
not subjected to the canon of the origin’s and the centre’s founding authority” (Richard 
50). The border, beyond disciplinary obedience, defined by a decolonial poetics, holds 
promise for the instantiation of a politics of knowledge, of address and recognition, that 
can provide an ethics of relationality. Importantly, in making a conscious choice to 
decolonize, to pursue a new narrative in the name of political, epistemic, and human 
liberation, these movements seize on what Wynter calls the ‘non-opacity’ of human 
agency, recognizing, even as they reclaim ancient stories, that they as humans in 
proximity are responsible for sustaining the worlds that they live in, freeing themselves 
from the extra-human agency of modernity/coloniality that organizes the world around 
the universal abstraction of Imperial Man (Ceremony Found 244). This means that not 
only is decolonial thought arrayed along a principle of thinking from, which relies on a 
productive form of obscurity in resistance to the transparency of disciplinary decadence, 
but this thinking from is also always a thinking with, in which the translational space of 
the border provides a form of agency via the recognition of proximity and the need to 
sustain one’s relationships with distinct genres of humanity. The philosophical 
anthropology of the decolonial subject is thus tied to a metacritique of reason actualized 
in the space of the border, and it is from this articulation of embodied concrete humanity 
that decoloniality forms an ethics of political liberation. 
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Beth Brant’s Politics of Address: Towards an Ethics of 
Liberation 
 By now I have examined the philosophical anthropology of the decolonial subject, 
as well as the space of the border as a translational space that critiques 
modernity/coloniality’s construction of the world according to the organizing coherence 
of Imperial Man. I will now turn to the look at the politics of address and recognition as a 
means of pursuing an ethics based on a project of political liberation and decolonial 
agency that is relational and creative. In doing so, I will consider how poetics, as part of 
knowledge production within interacting autopoietic fields, is able to advance a 
decolonial attitude, such that the poem itself, as part of a larger political-epistemic 
project, functions as a decolonial gift, an invitation to think from/with the poet while 
being conscious of one’s own positionality. From this will emerge an ethics of love that is 
the basis for a path of decolonial healing - both through recognition of one’s own dignity 
for colonized/racialized subjects as well as through the need to unsettle one’s own 
investment in the normative fiction of Imperial Man and the sustaining process of 
colonial consumption. 
 In her poem “Telling” Mohawk poet Beth Brant confronts and negotiates the 
everyday and historical forms of violence that structure the relationship between the 
settler-state and Indigenous lives and bodies, rendering them and their ways of being and 
knowing in the world disposable. Against multiple forms of violence, Brant uses the 
poem to advance an alternative relationship based on love as a decolonizing ethics, one 
that is reciprocal rather than possessive, acknowledging its relationality rather than 
denying it. Brant asks her readers, Indigenous and non-Indigenous, to consider 
themselves in relation to these systems and histories of violence, with the goal of 
negotiating this inherited system of violence in order to heal Indigenous bodies and 
nations, while fostering decolonizing relationships of solidarity and accountability. 
Placing the poem in the critical horizon of heteropatriarchy and settler colonialism as 
specific formations of modernity/coloniality, I will track how Brant negotiates the 
inheritance of these global processes in the intimate space of the everyday, and how she 
asks her readers to negotiate these same violent relations in their own lives. Through the 
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shared experience of the poem as a decolonial gift, Brant and her readers open up a space 
of decolonial possibility, in which new political relationships create new horizons of 
ethical engagement. 
 I will divide this chapter into several sections. In the first section I will lay out the 
subject matter and context of the poem, beginning with the case of Helen Betty Osborne 
and the Missing and Murdered Indigenous women and girls from across Canada, placing 
these subjects within the context of settler-colonial heteropatriarchy. As a specific 
instantiation of the colonial difference, settler-colonial heteropatriarchy will provide a 
way of examining how Indigenous bodies are constructed as inherently violable in 
relation to the supposedly autonomous agency of settlers as a specific formation of 
Imperial Man. In the next section I will examine the poem’s relation to this context, 
exploring the way it connects with and performs that subject matter. Key to this will be 
placing the gendered social relations of settler-colonial heteropatriarchy within the 
context of modernity/coloniality, as a project that is both material as well as 
epistemological. This will allow me to consider how Brant places the poem in relation to 
the violence she depicts, and the legacy of the English language as a tool of colonization, 
through an examination of the politics of recognition at work in the poem. Then, I will 
move on to consider the poem’s figuration of the poet herself as someone who uses 
language to work with the inheritance of this violence, trying to reveal its connections 
and make sense of it all. This creates in the poem a concern with healing and 
accountability, fostered through a thematic focus on silence and secrets. These will be 
discussed through an examination of the politics of address in the poem and how she 
relates the violence to both Indigenous and non-Indigenous readers. On the one hand, to 
Indigenous readers she will offer a relationship of healing, reclaiming Indigenous bodies 
and creating new relations of Indigeneity, through the figure of what Kelly Aguirre calls 
AlterNatives. For and from settlers, she seeks solidarity based on respect of Indigenous 
bodies and accountability. In each case she wants to foster a renewed sense of social 
relations and their entanglements with and beyond colonial consumption. Finally, this 
leads to a consideration of the poem itself, and the political ontology that it fosters as a 
mode of storytelling that foregrounds Indigenous epistemology and social agency based 
on love.  
  
64 
 The most well known, that is to say, public, of the violence recollected by Brant is 
the case of Helen Betty Osborne. My information on Osborne is drawn from Amnesty 
International’s 2004 report Stolen Sisters: A Human Rights Response to Discrimination 
and Violence Against Indigenous Women in Canada. Born in Norway House, a Cree 
community in Manitoba, Osborne moved to the town of The Pas to complete high school 
and pursue higher education (Stolen Sisters 22). Due to assimilationist policies within 
Canada, it was necessary for Osborne to leave her community for the town of The Pas, as 
Norway House could provide only the first eight of the twelve grades (ibid). The Pas was 
a town with a population of about 6000, and deeply divided between the Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous communities. Importantly, an inquiry by the Manitoba Justice 
Department after her death found that “tensions between the two communities often 
turned violent, with the police failing to intervene” and “there was also a pattern of sexual 
harassment of Indigenous women and girls” which was itself routinely ignored by both 
police and the Department of Indian Affaires (ibid). This toxic and state-sanctioned 
situation came to a head for Osborne on the night of November 12, 1971 when, walking 
home from a dance, she was accosted and abducted by a car of four non-Indigenous men 
looking for sex (ibid). Refusing to follow the men, Osborne was abducted into the car, 
sexually assaulted and beaten, then taken to a cabin belonging to one of the men where 
she was beaten, and finally stabbed to death. It would be seventeen years before charges 
were laid, with one man sentenced to life, one acquitted and the two remaining men never 
charged (ibid). The Amnesty International report notes that the investigation was marred 
from the start by the RCMP’s racism. The investigating officers treated Osborne’s 
Indigenous friends and family as suspects rather than sources of information, taking them 
in for questioning while not taking the information they offered seriously (ibid, 23). This 
disregard for the testimony of those closest to Osborne, based on their Indigeneity, is 
most egregiously seen in the fact that not only did police fail to act on a tip naming the 
four men, but further, “although police were eventually convinced that these four non-
Indigenous men were responsible for the murder, unlike the Indigenous youths, they were 
not brought in for questioning” and this knowledge lay in the community, un-acted upon, 
until the first charges were finally laid in 1986 (ibid, 23). 
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 Brant invokes Helen Betty Osborne’s story in “a dream about Betty Osborne. / 
The last secrets of her life. / Stabbed fifty-six times with a screwdriver” (Brant 62-5). 
Indeed, the violence of the act dominates the poet’s imagination, perforating her 
consciousness in a way that parallels - without displacing through an easy equivalence - 
the violent stabs of the screwdriver that ended Helen Betty Osborne’s life. Drawing this 
connection she asks “What can heal the writer who dreams of Betty Osborne and can 
only imagine her / words? / Her Last words, NO. NO. NO” (154-7). Brant thus focuses 
not only on the violence that ended Betty Osborne’s life, but also on her resistance to this 
violence. However, attempting to carve the letters “BETTY OSBORNE” onto the paper, 
Brant is confronted with the distanced nature of the written word, the separation between 
the body subjected to violence and the poem, asking “why doesn’t it [the paper] bleed for 
you, my throwaway sister?” (75). In her work Remembering Vancouver’s Disappeared 
Women: Settler Colonialism and the Difficulty of Inheritance (2015), Amber Dean 
highlights the distance and lack of materiality that a name carries, noting that “names 
themselves tell us so little, almost nothing, about the women they represent if we did not 
know them in life” (Dean xxii). For both Dean as well as Brant, the names are meant not 
as a record that is capable of bearing witness to the life and death of the one named, but 
rather work to challenge readers to think about their own proximity to the name, and what 
forms of ethical agency this name requires. Brant’s poem thus negotiates her inability to 
make sense of the name ‘Betty Osborne’ in a way that connects the distance possessed by 
the name itself to the denial of agency and proximity that structures the violence 
experienced by her and other Indigenous women. In order to make this violence 
proximate, and gain a sense of agency capable of healing Indigenous bodies as well as 
hailing the reader into a shared social space, Brant expands beyond the specific case of 
Helen Betty Osborne, connecting this violence to others through the words “RAPE. 
MURDER. TORTURE. SPEECHLESSNESS. INCEST. / POVERTY. ADDICTION,” 
which index specific histories that Brant calls into being (70-1). It is from this 
combination of history and agency that Brant will give materiality to these words so as to 
make the violence endured by Indigenous women such as Osborne proximate, and 
therefore in need of ethical response.  
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 This litany of violence that is visited upon the minds and bodies of Indigenous 
women is repeated throughout the poem several times, acting as a refrain that indexes the 
larger historical and social context in which the specific, everyday experiences of 
violence are set. Indeed, the poem itself is dedicated to “Celeste who told me to tell and 
for Vickie,” presumably the two women who share with Brant their stories of abuse, one 
in direct conversation and the other indirectly through a diary that she gifts to Brant 
(2,12). Through the refrain of “RAPE. MURDER. TORTURE. SPEECHLESSNESS” 
(102,104) as well as the linking of other stories of abuse with that told about Helen Betty 
Osborne, Brant places these seemingly individual and separate experiences in a shared 
context and history of settler-colonial heteropatriarchy. The RCMP report put out in 
2015, Missing and Murdered Aboriginal Women: A National Operational Overview, 
notes that, in Canada across all police jurisdictions, there are 1,181 “incidents of 
Aboriginal female homicides and unresolved missing Aboriginal females… 164 missing 
and 1,017 homicide victims” from 1980 to the present (RCMP 3). While the report notes 
that 90% of the homicides have been solved, what concerns me here is the 
overrepresentation of Indigenous females in Canada’s homicide rate, and the social 
conditions that contribute to this fact (3). The Amnesty International report, given its 
wider scope and lack of affiliation with the settler-state, notes that “impunity for violence 
against women contributes to a climate where such acts are seen as normal and 
acceptable rather than criminal, and where women do not seek justice because they know 
they will not get it” (8). This impunity is bolstered by racist and sexist “stereotypes of 
Indigenous women as sexually ‘available’ to men” and a parallel refusal of police to see 
them as a community that needs protecting (17-8). Brant takes up this web of violence 
and state institutions in her poem, addressing her ‘throwaway’ kin and their survival 
through different experiences of violence that render them problem people. Importantly, 
just as Brant relates these separate acts of violence to “new words that do not exist in our 
own language” (Brant, 169), so does the Amnesty International report to the actions of 
the Canadian settler-state and its disposition of Indigenous lands and rights as the root 
cause of this violence (Amnesty International, 8). Brant notes that, in this relationship of 
dispossession and colonial consumption, “Betty, your crime was being a woman, an 
Indian” and this assertion can itself be seen as a confrontation with the epistemic injustice 
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and disciplinary decadence that would attempt to separate the death of Helen Betty 
Osborne from the ongoing history of settler-colonialism and patriarchy in Canada (Brant 
66). 
 The production of Indigenous bodies as disposable, vulnerable to state and civil 
indifference, indexes the long history of settler-colonial heteropatriarchy in the 
destruction of traditional Indigenous kinship relations, genocide, and land dispossession. 
As Andrea Smith argues in Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide 
(2005) there is a close relationship between the sexual violence visited on the bodies of 
Indigenous women and the larger project of Indigenous genocide and settler-colonization. 
Constructing the body of Indigenous peoples generally, and women in particular, as dirty 
and degraded “the project of colonial sexual violence establishes the ideology that Native 
bodies are inherently violable - and by extension that Native lands are also inherently 
violable” (Smith, 12). In his essay “Cutting to the Roots of Colonial Masculinity” Scott 
L. Morgensen notes that when Europeans first came to Turtle Island, they encountered a 
“complementarity of Indigenous women’s and men’s authority” that structured the 
gender and social relations of Indigenous societies and tied them to the land (Roots, 42). 
Women were central to the nation, both as a means of reproducing the nation 
biologically, as well as through the transmission of knowledge and culture, providing 
links to the past that define Indigenous nations as autopoietic fields. Thus, in order to 
gain access to the land it was necessary to break up this gender complementarity, and as 
Smith notes, “patriarchal gender violence is the process by which colonizers inscribe 
hierarchy and domination on the bodies of the colonized” thereby rendering them, and 
their lands, disposable (Smith 23). This is the context in which Brant asserts that the 
crime of being an Indian and a woman results in a punishment of “mutilation and death” 
(Brant 67). Violence, in the settler-state, is thus the constitutive ground from which pre-
contact gender relations, and their ties to the land, are broken, and Indigenous bodies 
come to be rendered disposable. Brant’s negotiation of this violence will thus work 
through what it means to be Indigenous in a settler society. As she says in the poem, 
Brant is “carving letters on yellow paper to understand the violence committed against/ 
us, by us” (58-9).  
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 However, she also ties this mutilation and death to the silence of the town, a 
silence meant to “protect [the] whitemen” who were responsible for Helen Betty 
Osborne’s murder (70). This places the disposability of Indigenous women in a relational 
position to the agency and authority of the sovereign settler subject. As Morgensen 
argues, European forms of patriarchal subjectivity should be “understood as matters of 
achievement, as scarce goods, or as insecure or perishable if debility or certain gendered 
actions resulted in being ‘unmanned’” (Roots 41). Thus, attacks on Indigenous forms of 
gender complementarity or sexual variance at odds with the emerging structures of 
European patriarchy functioned not only to dispossess Indigenous nations of their lands, 
but further served to establish the basis upon which colonial authority and agency were 
produced. The very violence that forms Indigenous bodies as material devoid of agency, 
is thus also what forms settlers as individuals possessing a supposedly autonomous 
agency in a relation of colonial consumption in which Indigenous women are discarded 
while their lands and bodies are consumed for the benefit of the settler-state. Violence is 
thus the constitutive relation of settler-society, and represents not only a means of 
dispossessing Indigenous peoples of their land and agency, but of re-educating them into 
hierarchical relations as colonized subjects of settler authority.  
 One way of enforcing this education, translating Indigenous bodies from 
sovereign subjects of their own autopoietic fields to racialized minorities, devoid of 
agency within the authority of the Canadian settler-state, was through the institution of 
Residential Schools. Although they do not appear directly in Brant’s poem, Residential 
Schools as a technology of cultural governance stand at the heart of the Canadian settler-
state that is the context of the poem. As Sam McKegney argues, the Canadian nation-
building project motivated Residential Schools, as the education of Indigenous youth into 
heteropatriarchal relations served to “delegitimize Indigenous modes of territorial 
persistence” in order to open up their lands for exploitation (2). This education was done 
through “public displays of violence and humiliation” meant to damage empathy and 
produce obedience, a fear of the body, and hatred of Indigenous women (1, 4). 
Furthermore, the effects of Residential Schools have been traced to the current 
internalization of heteropatriarchal violence in Indigenous communities, as seen in 
Brant’s figure of the foster child who’s crippled leg, “burn marks shrivelling the skin,” 
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functions as the mark of this internalized violence within Indigenous communities (Brant 
30). Indeed, questioning whether it was the mother who burnt him, or if she merely took 
the blame to protect “her man’s secret”, Brant asks “what lengths and depths do we go to 
protect our own?” noting the ways in which loyalty to Indigenous community can 
sometimes reinforce internalized heteropatriarchal relations that value the agency and 
freedom of men over the wellbeing of women and children (Brant 31,33). Thus, separated 
from the kinship relations and gender cosmology that make up their autopoietic field, 
Indigenous subjects are produced as individual members of a racialized minority in 
Canadian society. Further, as noted above, this is a process that not only produces the 
sovereign settler-state, but also the form of masculine agency and subjectivity that it 
establishes as a normative value. To examine this confluence of violence and authority, 
vulnerability and agency, and the means by which it is naturalized, I will now turn to a 
consideration of settler-colonialism.  
 As Patrick Wolfe argues, while it makes use of racialized and gendered regimes 
of violence, the primary motivation of settler-colonialism as a structural coupling “is not 
race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory” (Wolfe 388). 
This is accomplished through a logic of elimination and control that, as we have seen, is 
predicated on a violent negation of pre-colonial autopoietic fields, as well as translation 
of pre-colonial subjects into the emerging settler-state. Ultimately, “settler colonialism 
destroys to replace” in a relationship of colonial consumption that accumulates at the 
expense of those it consumes (388). And, as has been shown through my examination of 
heteropatriarchy, this replacement has disastrous effects for Indigenous subjects, who 
find themselves vulnerable to violence and at the whims of the controlling agency of the 
settler-sate. Apart from Residential Schools, another facet of settler-colonialism can be 
seen in the Indian Act, which works to define Indigenous identity in a way that makes it 
manageable for the settler-state with the ultimate goal of assimilation. As Morgensen 
argues, the Act “exemplifies the role that colonial masculinity plays in institutionally 
containing Indigenous people as subordinates to settler rule,” contributing to the breaking 
up of Indigenous nations and imposing a patrilineal structure of authority and agency 
(Roots 49-50). Under settler-colonialism then, the law itself becomes a means by which 
the founding violence of the settler-state is codified and naturalized in a territorial nomos. 
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Indeed, authority, agency, and knowledge production become entangled in the Canadian 
settler-state as an autopoietic field maintained by a violent process of colonial 
consumption.  
 In this process of colonial consumption the figure of the settler as Imperial Man 
provides coherency. This coherency in turn legitimizes a production of knowledge that 
works through the denial of either the severity of Canada’s colonial past, or the continued 
relevance of this past to contemporary social conditions. For instance, legislation such as 
the Indian act that controls and manages definitions of Indigeneity also works to produce 
the figure of ‘the Native’ as one that is always disappearing into a lost authenticity, 
whose world is past and whose destiny is absorption into a capitalist modernity. 
However, as Wolfe argues “settler colonialism is not some transitional phase that gives 
way to…the emergent global order” but rather is foundational to it (Neoliberal 113). The 
sovereign separation of settler and Indigenous agency, constructed in a hierarchical 
relation of authority from the perspective of the settler-state, “continues in new forms, 
constituting new frontiers appropriate to the emergent mode of accumulation on a global 
scale” (114). In connecting settler-colonial structures to the global order, Wolfe 
highlights the global aspect of settler-colonial authority, and its constitutive entanglement 
with processes of modernity/coloniality. Thus, the contemporary functioning of settler-
colonialism and Imperial Man allows the relational nature of colonial agency and 
authority to be ignored while justifying it as the result of Indigenous subjects stuck 
between an authentic past and true modernity, who are failing to disappear in the proper 
way and so must be made to disappear through violence. 
 It is this process of structural coupling underlying the settler-state that Brant 
acknowledges when she notes that “they taught us new words” and “they stole our speech 
and raped our minds” (Brant 69,77). Importantly, language here indexes not only the 
confrontation of separate histories, but separate epistemologies as well. As Kelly Aguirre 
argues “decolonization not only requires confronting and dismantling structures of 
colonial power [i.e. colonial heteropatriarchy] but also a pervasive coloniality that 
renders Indigenous ways of being and knowing dependent on external ‘recognition’ and 
so consistently denied” (Aguirre 185). Thus, settler-colonialism as a material as well as 
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an epistemological project, allows us to mark how modernity and colonialism are not 
separate phenomenon, but rather constitutive of each other in the production of 
subjectivity, agency, and knowledge. Indeed, this collusion can be seen in Smith’s 
argument that modern forms of epistemology based on Eurocentric histories have 
functioned to produce Indigeneity as the object of study, never as the legitimate producer 
of knowledge (Queer 44). It is therefore only by turning away from these epistemologies 
that decolonial forms of agency can be established from which to create a new 
relationality capable of combating the violence leveled at, and productive of, Indigenous 
bodies.  
 I will now pursue this by looking at Glen Sean Coulthard’s concept of the politics 
of recognition, a direct response to the universalizing reach of modernist epistemology. 
Writing in response to a change in settler-Indigenous relations to a tone of recognition of 
Indigenous difference and reconciliation of Indigenous rights with the sovereignty of the 
settler-state, Coulthard argues that the relationship is still a colonial one, in which 
Indigenous subjects continue to exist as racialized minorities subject to the agency and 
authority of the settler state. He argues that this happens for two reasons. Firstly, it reifies 
the settler-state as a legitimate authority, absolving it of its continued colonial 
relationship by which “the terms of recognition tend to remain in the possession of those 
in power” (Coulthard 39). That is, with no mutual proximity in terms of recognition, the 
terms by which this recognition is produced are firmly in control of the settler-state. 
Secondly, similar to the internalization of heteropatriarchy by Indigenous subjects, 
Coulthard also argues that these same subjects can form psychosocial “attachments to 
these structurally circumscribed modes of recognition” (18). This is where Coulthard 
advocates for a collective ‘turning away’ from colonial modes of recognition to “initiate 
the process of decolonization by first recognizing themselves as free, dignified and 
distinct contributors to humanity” (43). That is, Indigenous subjects must turn to each 
other and a revitalization of their own traditions and knowledges. He says that “by 
contrast, the approach to recognition advocated [by him and others] explicitly eschews 
the instrumental rationality central to the liberal politics of recognition and instead 
demands that we enact or practice our political commitments to Indigenous national and 
women’s liberation in the cultural form and content of our struggle itself” (159). That is, 
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a turn towards Indigenous modes of knowledge and being as autopoietic fields that 
disrupt colonial consumption, rather than trying to prove their humanity in the model of 
Imperial Man and so gain access to colonial authority and agency founded on violence.  
 This move beyond a lens of colonial recognition leads to a consideration of poetry 
as an autopoietic practice, turning the poem from a means of liberal representation to a 
form of political agency that can be conceived as ‘languaging’. For example, Brant asks 
in the poem “if love could be made visible, would it be in the enemy’s language?” (Brant 
55). This places language itself in the frame of settler-colonialism, implicating it in the 
violence faced by Indigenous bodies. Similarly, Brant also asks “what good is a poet that 
doesn’t remember the language her grandfather / taught her?” (73-4). Thus, language in 
the poem is a means of negotiating the violence of colonialism, manifested in the loss of 
her own language and the broken transmission of knowledge between her and her 
grandfather, as well as the entanglement of language with systems of violence that negate 
Indigenous agency. By shifting focus to the colonial legacies that are entangled with 
modernity, it thus becomes possible to see poetry as one of many discursive genres that 
are formed in ambiguous support of the settler-state. Against the fixed forms of grammar 
and control over language, Mignolo puts forth the idea that “it is languaging, thinking and 
writing between languages…[that will] allow us to emphasize, moving away from the 
idea that language is a fact (e.g., a system of syntactic, semantic, and phonetic rules), and 
moving toward the idea that speech and writing are strategies for orienting and 
manipulating social domains of interaction” (Local/Global 226). Languaging brings to 
the fore the relation of the body to the underlying structures through which language 
makes it legible or not: “My anger burns me. I feel as if I have swallowed hot grease” 
(Brant 35). Furthermore, in languaging the written word becomes a political relationship, 
indexing the desire to social and political healing, that is, decolonization. Thus, for Brant, 
despite its entanglement with the violent history and present of settler-colonialism, the 
English language is ultimately “the only weapon I know how to use” (Brant 181). Brant 
thus places the poem as and intervention, taken up from the perspective of Indigeneity, 
into the violent processes of heteropatriarchy and the settler-state, effecting a movement 
from ‘the Native’ as object of study to producer of knowledge that Smith advocates. 
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 Languaging, and Brant’s use of language in the poem, thus ties together history, 
the body and language, as the body of the poet herself becomes a medium by which the 
violence of settler colonialism comes to be known and acknowledged. For example, 
Brant asks several times in the poem ‘what good is a poet?’ and states that “I hear those 
words today and they hang like a knife - or a screwdriver - / over my head, reader to 
pierce me and render me / speechless” (80-3). Fraught with violence then, the question of 
the poet’s role becomes not just one of recognizing settler-colonial violence, but of 
reacting to it in a way that revitalizes non-colonial agency. Furthermore, the role of the 
poet as medium comes through connecting the violence directed at Indigenous bodies and 
the lives and privileges of settlers. This is mobilized through the theme of silence and 
secrets. Against the silences that are incurred to maintain settler modes of power and 
agency, Brant establishes reciprocal relationships with the Indigenous figures of the 
poem. For instance, in the opening of the poem, Brant notes that one of her interlocutors 
“gives me this / secret” (10-11). The secret becomes a trope that exists somewhere 
between the negating silence of the settler-state, and an appropriation of those secrets that 
would deny the tellers themselves any sort of autonomy, and thus reproduce the 
authoritative agency of Imperial Man. Indeed, the question becomes not so much what 
Brant does with the secrets, but rather “what does she do with the need of someone to 
tell?” (28). Claiming that “I have to tell. / It is the only thing I know how to do” the 
agency of the poet is to act as a medium for those who have been targeted by the violence 
of settler-colonial heteropatriarchy (196-7). However, she also claims that “I must keep 
the secrets safe” highlighting that it is a shared and reciprocal agency, one that respects 
the autonomy and agency of those who give her their secrets (87). The keeping and 
telling of secrets thus becomes a form of proximity that seeks to expose complicity of the 
settler state with colonial, patriarchal violence, while at the same time pointing to a 
relationship of responsibility with her subject that is non-coercive, non-hierarchical, 
sustained by reciprocity rather than violence. “I want my words to be Medicine” she later 
says, hoping that by making these secrets visible in a way that respects their teller’s own 
agency and experiences she will be able to give them back the dignified relationships and 
knowledge of themselves necessary for decolonization (141).  
  
74 
 Existing in language as a political act, a state of constant translation, Brant seeks a 
new form of knowledge that connects bodies, and engages the reader with questions, 
while not making her own agency as poet dependent on the subsumption and 
management of her subject mater into stable system of hierarchical relations. This can be 
thought through Maldonado-Torres’ idea of the decolonial gift. In the context of 
decolonial thought, Maldonado-Torres argues that concepts need to be thought of as 
invitations to dialogue and not as impositions. They are expressions of the availability of 
the subject to engage in dialogue and the desire for exchange” (Being 115). This 
expression of availability is one that seeks a new ethics, beyond the non-ethics of colonial 
recognition, and works to structure thought as a border space in which reader and thinker 
are brought into proximity. In offering her poem as a form of healing, Brant allows us to 
see that the poem is itself a form of decolonial gift which asks one to teleologically 
suspend one’s investment in processes of colonial consumption and identification with 
the figure of Imperial Man as the guarantor of knowledge and agency.  
 The poem as a decolonial gift leads to a new construction of audience, through a 
queered politics of address. In her work on the intersections of queer theory and 
Indigenous studies, Andrea Smith notes how a subjectless critique can open up questions 
as to who is the political subject of a given theory: “A subjectless critique can help Native 
studies (as well as ethnic studies) escape the ethnographic entrapment by which Native 
peoples are rendered simply as objects of intellectual study, and instead can foreground 
settler colonialism” (Queer 46). That is, through a queer reading we can help place 
identities within the history of power relations within settler-colonialism, eschewing a 
dichotomous relation of an authentic Indigenous particularity to modern Eurocentric 
universalism for a focus on relations of power in an autopoietic field. Martin Joseph 
Ponce extends this concept from theory to literature, advocating a queer theory of 
reading, that will exceed either of the privileged frames - race or nation - by which 
minority literature is usually classified, tracking the way that “literature addresses 
multiple audiences at once and how those multivalent addresses are mediated through 
gender, sexuality, eroticism and desire” (2). If the focus on the poet articulates who is 
doing the writing, and the content being written about, then a politics of address examines 
who is being written to, and acknowledges that for decoloniality, this who is always 
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multiple. Thus, what Ponce advocates is “a practice of connectivity, of seeking out 
relationalities that form beyond the strictures of normative social boundaries. Theorizing 
reading in this manner enables us to reconceptualize identity as unfixed, permeable, and 
mutually interdependent on others” (32). What emerges is a mode of address that is 
destabilized, with no transcendental political referent, but rather a shifting one, in which 
the identity through which readers relate to the poem is formed in their proximity to the 
poet through the poem. This requires a decolonial attitude that “demands responsibility 
and the willingness to take many perspectives, particularly the perspectives and points of 
view of those whose very existence is questioned and produced as insignificant” (Being 
116). 
 A queer politics of address thereby leads to a split in Brant’s audience, between 
those hailed as Indigenous subjects and those hailed as settlers. However, in each case, 
the reader is asked not to witness the poem, as a static representation disconnected from 
their everyday life, but rather to encounter it and consider what Amber Dean calls 
practices of inheritance, ways of living in the wake of the structures of violence and 
events that link the poem to its autopoietic field. This is a complex idea developed by 
Dean, in conjunction with other thinkers, and revolves around the reader confronting and 
negotiating their implicatedness “in the violence or suffering experienced by others” (6). 
Quoting Roger Simon, she notes that practices of inheritance are practices whose 
“outcome is not guaranteed in advance, the work of inheritance is an inescapable 
consequence of the actions of another who has sent you something” (3). Of course, this 
gift can always be denied, and the vulnerability of Indigenous women to violence, and the 
disregard of this violence can be seen as refusals of this inheritance in affirmation of 
Imperial Man and colonial consumption. Dean goes further however, to note that, as 
opposed to a limited conception of witnessing, in which an empathetic attachment is 
made by reducing difference to a universal category of sameness, practices of inheritance 
work by drawing attention to the historical structures of power that form the relationship 
of inheritance. Against an identification that erases structures of power, or a distance that 
negates a shared space and humanity, practices of inheritance seek to ethically challenge 
the reader to locate themselves relationally to the poem (Dean10). 
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 In hailing her audience as Indigenous, Brant asks them to see themselves in 
relation to the model of Indigeneity that is offered in the poem, opening up a form of 
relationality that can configure Indigenous identity capable of resisting the authoritative 
and violent control of the settler-state. Importantly, this is not a vision of Indigeneity that 
simply resurrects static traditions, but rather a form of what Aguirre calls AlterNatives, 
built by attending to everyday practices “that aren’t responsive to colonial power” 
(Aguirre 192). Thus, the practices that Brant figures in the poem are through the everyday 
sharing of conversation and recording, such as when she “receive[s] a package in the mail 
/ When I open it, a diary falls into my hands” (12-3). The everyday, private practice of 
diary keeping, and the gift of it to Brant, thus figure an Indigenous resilience that occurs 
in spaces that are not legible to the settler-state as political resistance. Similarly, the 
communication of stories, across distances and in person, becomes a mode of 
relationality that extends Indigeneity across the settler-state in excess of a supposedly 
static authenticity. As Aguirre says: “This shift is effectuated by upholding stories of 
resistance to and resilience through violence, but crucially those that also regenerate and 
refigure still existing, particular and substantive alternatives to colonial forms of 
relationality” (185). Thus, rather than starting from a static authenticity located in the 
past, Brant locates the bonds of a resurgent Indigeneity in the present, working from an 
acknowledgment of violence while finding everyday practices of Indigenous resilience 
that ground the resurgence of Indigenous autopoietic fields. For instance, the people in 
the poem whose stories she negotiates as inheritance, and offers to the readers, are, 
despite their violent experiences, cast as innocent: “Her face is wide, innocent, clear” (1-
2). Importantly however, this is not an abstract innocence but a proximate one, embodied 
and in need of nurturing, as when she says to her foster child: “You were innocent. You 
were difficult” (48). The fusion of difficulty and innocence comes to enact the 
negotiation of Indigenous identity and knowledge in the violence of the settler-state, and 
the kind of reciprocal agency needed. What emerges for the poet as medium is thus a 
form of relationality that re-centres Indigenous gender relations, as when Brant says that 
“today I woke bleeding from my vagina…” in order to centre her female body as a 
medium for knowledge production and agency (95-100). There are a multitude of bonds 
formed throughout the poem through the bodies of Indigenous women, some face to face, 
  
77 
some through long distance communication, and some, like the story of Helen Betty 
Osborne, the throwaway sister, through a shared space of heteropatriarchal violence. 
Ultimately, what emerges is a relationality that is premised on the re-centering of 
Indigenous gender cosmologies that value women as knowledge producers and active 
agents. The ultimate value is placed not on rigidly prescribed roles, but rather on a shared 
sense of agency “Do I giver her what she needs? / A friend. A secret-keeper. / Love.” 
(106-8). What is needed is not mere biological reproduction, but a reciprocal relationality 
that can protect and heal without resorting to hierarchical and authoritative forms of 
agency, and that calls Indigenous people to acknowledge and act on this relationship, to 
heal themselves and their kin. 
 She further links her turn to Indigenous community with an exploration of the 
consequences of this turn for settlers, the solidarity and accountability that is asked of 
them. By calling the potential reader into existence as a settler, Brant thus invites them 
into a relationship of solidarity and accountability to Indigenous peoples in the context of 
continuing settler colonialism, treading the line between sameness and difference and 
highlighting the entangled nature of agency and violence. Initially there is a line drawn 
between Indigenous and settler in terms of their relation to the scenes of violence that the 
poem mediates: “I love. They do not” says Brant, noting the initial distance that 
colonialism fosters in settler who see violence against Indigenous bodies as none of their 
concern (Brant 93). This absence of love in the settlers indexes the disposability of 
Indigenous lives and the ways that this violence and its connection to colonialism is 
rendered unintelligible. Against this the poem asserts its knowledge through the voice of 
the poet and her retelling of Indigenous stories against the silence meant to ‘protect white 
men’. By highlighting the role of settlers, and addressing them in a way that differentiates 
the audiences of the poem, she seeks to actualize the relationships of settler colonialism 
in the experience of the poem, the ways that settler agency is formed in relation to 
heteropatriarchal violence, and the implicatedness that every settler must face. This 
encourages a mode of settler-Indigenous relationality built on solidarity and 
accountability, respect for Indigenous bodies, knowledge, agency and authority that 
allows settlers to work together “without the impetus to absorb” and neutralize 
Indigenous struggles (Aguirre 202). 
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 Finally, I will consider the political ontology of the poem itself, how it holds 
together its various histories and relationships to effect love as agency, Indigenous 
relationality, and epistemic justice. Stewart-Harawira argues that in response to the 
violent and controlling structures of modernity/coloniality, what is needed is a “new 
political ontology for being together in the world” (134). Brant herself asks in the poem: 
“if love could be made visible, would it be on the skins of trees” drawing a connection 
between the need for a new relationship of being based on love and the mutilated present 
of settler-state violence (188). Through the practices of secret keeping, responsible 
telling, and poetry, Brant seeks a regeneration of Indigenous relationality that can make 
steps toward this ontology of love. Indeed, her practice of transmission based on 
reciprocal agency and respect can be seen as a form of what Aguirre calls story work “a 
mode of knowledge (re)production and transmission centred in the responsibility of 
storytelling that also acknowledges and draws out the narrativity of all knowledge 
practices” (Aguirre 184-5). Thus, the stories that Brant mediates are modes of knowing 
that reproduce a decolonial epistemology. The multiple stories and the politics of address 
of the poem work to braid stories into a conversation, placing the negotiation of stories 
and structures of power at the centre of the poem. Similarly, Brant makes use of several 
quotes by other Indigenous women poets, constructing an autopoietic field in which these 
new stories gain meaning through relationality. Ultimately, the conversation started by 
Brant seeks to “cut through to a place I can barely imagine” (Brant 115). This place 
would be the non-patriarchal, non-hierarchical, non-violent space of decoloniality. While 
the poem is set firmly in the present, responding to and negotiating settler, 
heteropatriarchal inheritance in the space/time of the poem, it thus offers an ambiguous 
hope for a future of decolonial love and healing. As she says at the end of the poem: 
“Love as piercing as the screwdriver’s thrust. / Love as searing as the marks on an 
infant’s leg. / Love as clear as her face. / Love as clean as a sheet of yellow paper. / Love 
as honest as a poem.” (191-195). Love is thus an embodied ethics of solidarity and 
proximity built on political liberation in recognition of the decolonial gift of the poem, 
addressed to those willing to engage in the decolonial attitude. 
 Ultimately, Brant eschews a politics that sees Indigenous agency as legible only 
when recognized by the settler-state, opting for a political ontology of liberation that 
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places Indigenous resistance in the context of Creation as “an ongoing process of renewal 
of which humans are only a part” (191). Poetry is one such form of renewal, bringing 
together diverse bodies in solidarity to produce a new potentiality for decolonizing 
relationships based on a form of agency that is non-dominative and reciprocal. What 
emerges from this new political ontology of liberation, which places the decolonial 
subject in the space of the border, is thus an ethics of the decolonial attitude. From this 
politics of address emerges a new human community, oriented towards the sustaining of 
concrete humanity via an ethics of liberation, that is, a recognition of our co-humanity 
and the intimate relation between decolonial healing and the unsettling need to betray 
one’s investment in Imperial Man and colonial consumption.  
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Conclusion 
 
 In the introduction, I developed the concepts modernity/coloniality and 
decoloniality. I showed that modernity cannot be thought without coloniality, and that 
decoloniality grounded itself as both critical practice and productive creation of new 
horizons based on alternative memories and cosmologies. Noting that decoloniality is a 
political-epistemic project that seeks to transform the material-symbolic ordering of the 
world, I argued that decolonization it thus an autopoietic practice. In doing so, I defined 
modernity/coloniality as a particular organization of the world through a process of 
structural coupling conceptualized as colonial consumption around the figure of Imperial 
Man as the model of humanity. I concluded by arguing that an insurgent poetics was a 
necessary part of challenging the disciplinary decadence of knowledge production by 
tying knowing to the social composition of bodies. 
 In the first chapter, I turned to Aimé Césaire and the Black Caribbean in order to 
examine the philosophical anthropology of the decolonial subject. Locating Césaire as a 
Black Caribbean subject in the Black radical tradition, I read his work in relation to 
Mignolo’s concept of the geo- and body- politics of knowledge. In doing so, I was able to 
place Césaire’s poetics in a complex relationship to the historical and social reality of the 
Black Caribbean within modernity/coloniality, arguing that a poetic practice of thinking 
from this embodied positionality relied on an anthropology of the human as bios and 
logos. Furthermore, I argued that the productive obscurity of thinking from was such that 
the decolonial subject was formed so as to exceed and destabilize the structures of 
knowledge which had formerly consigned the Black subject to a mode of visible absence.  
 In the second chapter, I built on this philosophical anthropology by placing it in 
the space of the border, looking to the work of Cecilia Vicuña. Building off of Mignolo’s 
understanding of nomos as the juridical and political ordering of social space, I argued 
that the constitution of such space as unitary also involved the narration of origin stories 
that served to legitimize its ordering of bodies. In doing so, the process of colonial 
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consumption could be seen as a point of antagonism whereby an unequal structural 
coupling between two autopoietic unities is naturalized as a single autopoietic field for 
the benefit of a normalized subject – in this case for that of humanity as Imperial Man. 
Against this I proposed the space of the border as a space of proximity, where bodies are 
brought together in their distinctness and the knowledge of their need to sustain their 
shared world. Thus, what emerges is a form of translational agency that works to 
redistribute the unequal structural coupling to create a new autopoietic field inhabited by 
diverse genres of the human. 
 In the final chapter, I turned to the work of Beth Brant in order to show how the 
poem, in the space of the border and in relation to decolonial subjectivation, functions as 
a decolonial gift that engages the reader in an ethics of political liberation. Basing my 
analysis on the structures of settler colonialism that produce Indigenous vulnerability as 
the grounds for settler agency, I looked to how a politics of address could work to 
convoke different readers into a shared inheritance of the burden of history. 
 Thus, through these engagements with the work of diverse poets, I have been able 
to draw out a series of principles that decolonial poetics, in bringing together the three 
concerns broached by Lewis Gordon which organized my investigation, are able to 
articulate in regards to knowledge production as an autopoietic practice of thinking 
from/with. In the first place, decolonial poetics has provided us with a means of seeing 
the act of thinking from embodied subjects as a creative act of productive obscurity. 
Resisting the ontological transparency of disciplinary decadence, productive obscurity 
thus works by thinking from the history and geopolitical positionality of the body in ways 
that push beyond the abstract systems of knowledge that modernity/coloniality deploy in 
order to manage the world. Second, this productive obscurity, when placed in the space 
of the border, works to destabilize the processes of colonial consumption that construct 
bodies in service to modernity/coloniality. Against the distance of Imperial Man is thus 
offered a living in proximity that is always a thinking with concrete subjects in 
distinctness. Sustaining this distinctness leads to a form of translational agency that is 
constantly forming and reforming the world in recognition of an irreducible sociality. 
Thus, the productive obscurity of the decolonial subject is joined to a non-opacity of 
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social agency, in which humanity recognizes its role in creating and sustaining our shared 
worlds. Finally, this relation between obscurity and non-opacity leads to a consideration 
of the politics of address and recognition that structure ethical engagement. This provides 
us with the principle of the decolonial gift based on an ethical attitude of open 
engagement in the shared, though differently experienced, burden of history. Thus, any 
process of decolonial healing is tied to an unsettling of normative orders that in turn 
requires those who benefit from colonial structures to betray their investment in Imperial 
Man. Taken together, these principles lay the ground for a global ordering of 
pluriversality. 
 Pluriversality is an ordering of knowledge across different autopoietic formations. 
This is a way of rejecting the disembodied, abstract universal truth that sustains 
modernity/coloniality and Imperial Man, while articulating knowledge as a practice of 
Gordon’s ‘living thought.’ Thus “the roads to global futures shall be thought out in the 
scenario of interactions, conflicts, and dialogues among coexisting options, without 
hoping that one of them will overcome the other and impose itself on the rest” (Darker 
44). Following from this recognition that “the question is not to compete among different 
concepts of ‘humanity,’ but to start from the fact that non-Western notions more or less 
equivalent to what in the West were constructed as man” knowledge production becomes 
an autopoietic process of structural coupling (242). Thus “the decolonial option is the 
singular connector of a diversity of decolonial paths” and a way of putting into contact 
different situated modes of self-reflection (121). Rather than an abstract, disembodied 
universal then, universality becomes a reflection on one’s “limitation by engaging one’s 
distinct situation” in a way that requires an engagement with difference via a pluriversal 
dialogue that can transform these limits into possibilities for transformation and complex 
solidarity (Vallega 147). 
In this dialogue “the only singularity would be the connectors (not empty 
signifiers) that would anchor pluriversality as a universal project” and provide points of 
contact through which translational agency can manifest across different decolonial paths 
(241). It is from following these decolonial paths, within the overall context of a 
decolonial horizon of pluriversality, that autonomous communities will find ways of 
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articulating their past and present traditions of knowing and doing outside of coloniality, 
such that, as Robert Warrior argues “those traditions make the future a possibility, just as 
they did for the people with whom the traditions originated” (106). Ultimately, Mignolo 
argues, “I am not referring to something already fixed but to a constant process of 
building the very concept of decoloniality, of devising a route of action, of transforming 
ourselves into decolonial subjects” (Further Thoughts 26). This process is individual and 
communal, an autopoietic self-organization articulated in the concept of thinking 
from/with those racialized and colonized subjects who have been incorporated into the 
modern/colonial world system through the process of colonial consumption. Doing so 
will result in a restoration of agency, not only to the dominated, but to those who see 
themselves in the figure of Imperial Man as well, since their agency is sustained only by 
their autopoietic entanglement in coloniality. Our co-identification as humans, as hybrid 
beings, can never “pre-exist each society’s specific mode of autopoetic institution” 
(Ceremony Found 201). Pluriversality then, seeks an articulation of the global in which, 
recognizing the hybrid nature of humanity, the human is not an abstract figure, but rather 
a concrete embodiment linked across differences in recognition of a shared agency in the 
organization and sustenance of material-symbolic relations.  
Poetics as thinking from and with is thus a means through which to connect these 
distinct autopoietic fields beyond the coherence offered by Imperial Man and colonial 
consumption. The decolonial principles mentioned above – productive obscurity, 
translational agency, ethics of liberation –provide a means through which the production 
of knowledge can be opened up to embodied forms of self-reflection in an ethical 
engagement across concrete social relations. However, there remains an irreducible 
contingency to this articulation, an ambiguity that promises no easy resolution of 
harmonious co-existence but a continuous, creative emergence that must be actively and 
collectively sustained. This ambiguity persists across different articulations of bodies, 
knowledges, histories and cosmologies as political-epistemic divisions organized in 
services to the structures of modernity/coloniality. Insurgent poetics as a decolonial gift 
articulates shared desires to transform this ambiguity from a political-epistemic problem 
into an impetus for social experimentation, driving the recognition that we are radically 
responsible for our shared existence. For decolonial thought then, humanity cannot be 
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known through any single figure capable of ordering all social formations, but rather 
through the articulation of distinct genres of the human within a global autopoietic field 
capable of sustaining concrete human existence. 
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